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 Recent computational models and physiological studies suggest that simple, two-
alternative forced-choice decision making can be conceptualized as the gradual 
accumulation of sensory evidence.  Accordingly, information is sampled over time from a 
sensory stimulus, giving rise to an “activation function.”  A response is emitted when this 
function reaches a criterion level of activity.  Critically, the phenomenon known as 
“speed-accuracy tradeoff” (SAT) is modeled as a shift in the response boundaries 
(criterion).  As speed stress increases and criterion is lowered, the information function 
travels less distance before reaching threshold.  This leads to faster overall responses, but 
also an increase in error rate, given that less information is accumulated.  
Psychophysiological data using EEG and single-unit recordings from monkey cortex 
suggest that these “accumulator” models are biologically plausible.  The present work is 
an effort to strengthen this position.  Specifically, it seeks to demonstrate a neural 
correlate of criterion and demonstrate its relationship to behavior.  To do so, subjects 
performed a letter discrimination paradigm under three levels of speed stress.  At the 
same time, electroencephalogram (EEG) was used to derive a measure known as the 
lateralized readiness potential, which is known to reflect ongoing motor preparation in 
motor cortex.  In Experiment 1, the amplitude of the LRP was related to speed stress: as 
subjects were forced to respond more quickly, less information was accumulated before 
making a response.  In other words, criterion lowered.  These data are complicated by 




It is a matter of common knowledge that one’s ability to perform a task is 
hindered by the need to perform it quickly.  Essentially, errors are more likely to result in 
nearly any task when one is in some sense “rushed,” compared with performance in an 
unrushed task.  The converse holds as well: when a task must be performed with high 
accuracy, more time will pass between start and finish.  In scientific circles, this 
phenomenon is known as the speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT), and it forms an important 
part of modern decision making theory.  Specifically, any complete model of decision 
making must include a mechanism with which to implement the SAT.  To date, the most 
successful class of models meeting this demand are based on a sequential-sampling 
process in two-alternative forced choice tasks (2AFC).  Accordingly, information is 
thought to be continually sampled, over time, from a stimulus.  This information is 
accumulated, giving rise to an “activation function” that represents the momentary 
amount of evidence for option “A” over option “B”.  A response is produced when this 
activation function reaches a boundary (“criterion”).  As will be shown, movement of the 
criterion imposes the SAT and accounts for associated changes in accuracy rate and RT 
(Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998).  Despite their now widespread use, and their 
ability to account for a wide range of behavior, it remains to be shown that such models 
are a plausible depiction of the way decisions are produced in the brain.  Following up on 
pioneering work making this case (e.g., Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Hanes & Schall, 1996; 
Shadlen & Newsome, 2001), the present work will explore the mechanism through which 
the SAT is implemented and the biological plausibility of such a mechanism.  The 
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following section introduces the basics of the sequential-sampling process in the context 
of a simple game. 
The Urn Game 
Imagine that you are presented with two urns, each containing some number of 
quarters and dimes.  Urn Q contains mostly quarters, but also some dimes.  Urn D 
contains mostly dimes, but also some quarters.  On each “trial,” you are presented with 
only one urn – you do not know which urn it is, nor can you see inside of it – and you 
must decide whether it is urn Q or D.  To help you decide, you are allowed to sample, 
one-by-one, coins from each urn.  For present purposes, assume that coins are sampled at 
a fixed rate.  You are not told how many items to sample, but two critical facts are 
understood.  First, if you are correct in your decision, you are allowed to keep all of the 
money in the urn.  Thus, it is in your best interest to maintain high accuracy.  Second, 
because sampled coins are thrown away, the fewer the samples, the more money left 
inside.  For this reason, it is also in your best interest to arrive at a decision quickly, 
sampling as little as possible consonant with an acceptable accuracy rate.  Three 
important factors will influence what decision you make and how long it takes to arrive at 
that decision. 
Criterion 
Each time you draw a sample, you accumulate some evidence in favor of one of 
the two urns.  Obviously, you would not want to continue sampling without end; rather, 
you must establish what constitutes enough evidence to stop and make a decision.  In the 
models considered here, this “criterion” or “threshold” level represents the relative 
amount of evidence for urn Q versus urn D that must be reached before emitting a 
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response.  In other words, how many quarters over dimes must be sampled in order to 
make a Q decision?  Once this criterion is reached, you discontinue sampling and emit a 
response. 
The choice of a criterion level will have a direct impact on your winnings.  Figure 
1 depicts a simulated record of the accumulation process.  The solid upper and lower 
boundaries represent a high criterion setting; the dashed lines a low setting.  The red step-
function indicates the relative evidence in favor of either of the urns, each step being 










Figure 1.  The effect of criterion variance on the decision process in the simple urn game.  
Note that with a low criterion (dashed horizontal), an incorrect “D” response would be 
produced at an early point in time.  With a high criterion, a correct response is produced, 
but with a longer RT. 
 
First consider the high criterion case.  Because dimes and quarters are intermixed, 
the information function demonstrates periodic up and down movements.  Slowly, the 
function drifts towards the Q boundary.  At some point, a criterion level of evidence is 
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reached and a Q response is produced.  Contrast this with a low criterion case.  After only 
two samples, the D boundary is met, resulting in a very fast, but erroneous, response.  In 
some situations, a low criterion is beneficial – particularly when speed is emphasized 
over accuracy.  This is the basis of the SAT (Ratcliff, 1978; Wickelgren, 1977; Lohman, 
1989).   
Prior Probability 
The base-rate probability of being presented with urn D or Q will also surely 
impact your decision, and how long you take to make it.  In the previous example, it was 
assumed that urn D and urn Q are presented with equal frequency.  For this reason, the 
information function in Figure 1 begins equidistant from the Q and D boundaries.  This 
need not be the case.  For instance, suppose you are told that urn Q is twice as likely to 
occur as urn D.  In this instance, it would be wise to bias your decision process towards D 
even before the sampling process begins.  The net result of this bias is to reach the Q 








Figure 2.  The effect of prior probability on the decision process in the simple urn game.  
When urn Q is twice as likely, the accumulation process begins “biased” towards the Q 
boundary, producing shorter RTs for that decision. 
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Note that on this trial, the Q boundary was reached after only 3 samples.  Every so often, 
of course, this will lead to an error – a run of three quarters is not implausible even when 
urn D is presented.  However, because urn Q is presented twice as often, these errors 
carry less weight.  Thus, most of the time, this bias will speed correct decisions. 
Rate of Information Accumulation 
The rate of information accumulation does not refer to how quickly one samples – 
this was assumed to be some fixed value.  Rather, it is akin to d’ from signal detection 
theory – in this case, the proportion of dimes to quarters within each urn.  Figure 3 
depicts what the accumulation record might look like for a near-random mixture and a 








Figure 3.  The effect of change in proportion of dimes to quarters on the rate of 
information accumulation.  When there is a large difference, nearly every sample will 
move the function towards the correct boundary.  When there is a more random mixture, 
it takes longer to reach criterion. 
 
For the near-random mixture, it is evident that the information function requires many 
samples to reach the Q boundary.  Contrast this with a situation where there is a large 
proportion of dimes to quarters in urn D: nearly every sample will move the information 
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function towards the correct boundary (Figure 3).  Altering the proportion of dimes to 
quarters in the urns, then, affects how long, on average, it takes for the information 
function to reach criterion. 
The rate at which the function approaches boundaries is conceptually similar to d’ 
in signal detection theory.  If we consider the D distribution to be noise and the Q to be 
signal, then d’ indicates the overlap between the two distributions.  When there is little 
overlap, samples from the noise distribution are easily distinguishable from samples from 
the signal distribution.  When there is much overlap (as when dimes and quarters are 
randomly intermixed), it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate signal from noise1.  
Sequential-Sampling Models and the “Accumulator in the Brain” 
The above vignette embodies modern theories of decision making known as 
“sequential-sampling” models.  There are a variety of instantiations in this class of 
models, some of the more popular being the random-walk (Link & Heath, 1975), the 
diffusion (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998), the leaky, competing accumulator 
(Usher & McClelland, 2001), and the Linear Approach to Threshold with Ergodic Rate 
(“LATER”; Carpenter & Williams, 1995; Reddi & Carpenter, 2000).  The success of 
these models can be traced to four essential properties held in common: 1) the 
accumulation of evidence, over time 2) some form of bias, manipulable by prior 
probability, 3) the idea of a drift rate, manipulable by quality of information, and 4) the 
idea of a criterion level of evidence and its relationship to the SAT.  Depicted in Figure 4 
is a generalized sequential sampling model.  The reader should note that the model is 
virtually identical to that provided in the above vignette, albeit with different names for 
the parameters.  And, obviously, the information being sampled is no longer quarters and 
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dimes, but evidence from some sensory event. 
Sequential sampling models have been extensively tested and verified in a wide 
variety of research domains, task paradigms, and subject populations (Luce, 1986; 
Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).  They have become intensely popular not only because they are 
extraordinarily accurate at predicting behavioral performance, but because they are 
parsimonious (a model with 3 free parameters can reproduce entire response time 
distributions for both correct and error trials as well as mean error rates; note the 








Figure 4.  An idealized random walk/diffusion model.  Note that the geometry of the 
decision process gives rise to the positively skewed RT distributions commonly observed. 
  
 Showing that a particular mathematical model can reproduce behavioral 
performance is impressive and certainly provides a framework for conceptualizing the 
decision process.  Nevertheless, it is important to consider whether the models, as 
described, bear any relationship to the brain mechanisms responsible for decision 
making.  If they do not, then the models are little more than tools of prediction.  Although 
this may be sufficient in some cases, it does not fulfill the ultimate goals of cognitive 
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psychology and cognitive neuroscience – namely, to discover the cognitive mechanisms 
that govern behavior as well as understand how they are implemented in the brain. 
 Fortunately, recent neurophysiological evidence shows that we may not abandon 
sequential-sampling models in the near future.  Quite to the contrary, research has shown 
that these same models can describe single-unit recordings from monkey cortex.  What’s 
more, the time-course of neural activity can be used to predict, with near certainty, the 
nature of the impending response as well as its latency.  Though it should not be 
surprising that some form of neural activity predicts behavioral responses, what is 
impressive is the specific pattern of neural activity, its relationship to established 
behavioral models, and our ability to manipulate that pattern of data in a predictable 
manner.  Together, this provides evidence that sequential-sampling models are 
biologically plausible (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Roitman & 
Shadlen, 2002; Hanes & Schall, 1996).  As will be detailed below, certain cortical 
neurons appear to exhibit a “ramping” of activity in the presence of stimulation, with the 
rate of ramping proportional to the quality, or strength, of the signal (Hanes & Schall, 
1996).  The reader will recall that this is similar to the drift rate parameter discussed 
previously.  And, like the before mentioned mathematical models, it appears that cortical 
neurons are sensitive to the prior probability of encountering a stimulus; they become 
more or less active when the probability of encountering a preferred or nonpreferred 
stimulus, respectively, is high, even before any stimulus is presented (Platt & Glimcher, 
1999; see also Basso & Wurtz, 1997, 1998; Dorris & Munoz, 1998).  Finally, and most 
important for present purposes, neural activity reaches a fixed, criterion level of activity 
at the point an overt response is produced, regardless of the resulting RT (Hanes & 
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Schall, 1996; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002).   
 What has yet to be demonstrated, however, is that criterion – in the neural sense – 
can be manipulated.  Again, sequential-sampling models suggest that it can, through 
manipulations of SAT instructions, payoffs, deadline procedures, and the like.  More 
specifically, criterion should fall with speed emphasis and rise with accuracy emphasis.  
But, within any given SAT “setting” – say, a block of “accuracy” trials, criterion should 
remain constant.  To date, research has confirmed only the latter – a fixed criterion.  This 
has been observed not only in single-unit responses, but in neural populations, as 
evidenced through electroencephalographic recordings (EEG).  In neural firing records, 
research finds that a response (say, an arm or eye movement) is produced at the precise 
moment certain neurons reach a specified firing rate, regardless of that movement’s 
latency.  Using EEG, research finds that hemispheric lateralization during hand 
movements reaches a fixed value at the moment an overt movement is produced, again 
regardless of latency.  Whether or not these fixed values can be modulated by changes in 
SAT setting is unknown, and is the main goal of the present work. 
 Finding a neural correlate of SAT setting is important in at least two regards.  
First, it would provide further evidence for the biological plausibility of accumulator 
models2.  Second, it would explain the SAT in mechanistic terms.  Very often, SAT 
settings are stated in such nondescript terms as a “cognitive set for accuracy” or 
“cognitive set for speed.”  The present work attempts to discover, quantitatively, a neural 
basis of these cognitive sets.  To maintain proper context for this exploration, the 
following section reviews evidence for the neural implementation of accumulator models, 
focusing first on evidence from single unit recordings, followed by neural population 
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studies using EEG in human subjects as well as functional imaging with fMRI.  
Evidence for the Neural Implementation of Accumulator Models 
 Any neural implementation of an accumulator model first needs a signal to 
accumulate.  In the previous vignette, this signal was a record of sequential samples of 
quarters and dimes.  In more reductionist terminology, this signal should code basic 
stimulus attributes necessary for task performance.  Take, for instance, a simple motion 
discrimination task in which subjects must decide which direction a field of dots are 
moving.  Each sample (for example, each screen refresh) might represent a binary 
decision as to whether motion was in a particular direction or not.  Over a period of time, 
one collects this evidence and produces a response when some criterion level of evidence 
is reached.  In a perceptual categorization task, the accumulated signal might code the 
extent to which a picture resembles, say, a house or a face.  Based on the sequential-
sampling models described above, this signal should vary in intensity based on the 
“quality” or strength of the evidence.  For instance, a suprathreshold picture of a face 
would exemplify a strong signal, while a perithreshold stimulus, degraded and presented 
amidst noise exemplifies a weak signal.    
Obviously, the signal that is accumulated must originate from areas of cortex that 
are specialized for the task at hand.  One area of cortex that has proven a fruitful area of 
inquiry is middle temporal (MT), also known as V5.  Cells in MT are motion sensitive 
and direction selective.  Thus, it is possible to find neurons that fire vigorously when 
motion of a particular direction is presented in its receptive field (RF).  Likewise, these 
same neurons often become suppressed in the presence of motion in another direction, 
often diametrically opposite to the preferred direction.  Importantly, the activity of MT 
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neurons has a near linear relationship to the strength of the motion stimulus (Britten et al., 
1993). 
 Using this well-defined cortical area, Newsome and colleagues have explored in 
detail how information provided by MT neurons might be used in the decision process.  
Their task, which will be referred to throughout this work as the “dot motion” task, 
presents subjects (in this case, monkeys) with a field of randomly moving dots (Figure 5).  










Figure 5.  Recording from area MT using the dot motion task.  Subjects view a dot 
stimulus, then, when the stimulus is removed, make a saccade to either of the targets 
corresponding to the perceived direction of motion. 
 
signal is manipulated by altering the proportion of dots moving coherently.  When the 
proportion of dots moving coherently is high, the motion signal is strong, the output from 
area MT is large, and psychometric performance is high.  Likewise, as coherence is 
decreased, MT responses decrease (Britten et al., 1993) as well as psychometric 
performance (Newsome, Britten, & Movshon, 1989).  Typically, monkeys respond to the 
perceived direction of motion with a saccade after some short presentation interval. 
 Explorations into this cortical area have revealed an exquisitely straightforward 
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model of the neural decision process.  Single-unit experimental (Newsome, Britten, & 
Movshon, 1989) and modeling studies using actual MT data as input 
 
Figure 6.  The neural decision making model of Shadlen et al., (1996).  Pools of 
rightward and leftward preferring neurons are pooled, and then compared.  The larger of 
the two dictates the decision. 
 
(Shadlen et al. 1996) liken the decision process to a simple comparison between pools of 
directionally sensitive MT neurons (Figure 6).  For example, imagine a pool of neurons 
whose RF is selective for rightward motion, and an opposing pool of neurons selective 
for leftward motion.  At the beginning of a trial, all the neurons fire at base rate, and thus 
exhibit no discrimination.  Upon onset the stimuli, however, one group fires significantly 
more than the other.  The simplest possible decision rule would be to choose LEFT when 
the leftward-selective pool was most active and RIGHT when the rightward-selective 
pool was most active.  Surprisingly, such a simple model (with ancillary assumptions) 
very accurately reproduces psychometric performance (Shadlen et al., 1996).  This 
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implies that the output of MT neurons is somehow compared during the decision making 
process.  Where this comparison takes place will be discussed later. 
 Further evidence that the output of two opposing pools of neurons participate in 
the decision process is the observation that microstimulation of leftward-selective 
neurons slows rightward decisions (Ditterich, Mazurek, & Shadlen, 2003).  If only 
leftward-selective neurons participated in leftward decisions, then there is no reason why 
stimulation of rightward-selective neurons should at all affect the decision process.  To 
summarize, these studies show that 2AFC decisions may be based on the compared 
output of 2 pools of selective neurons. 
 Although MT neurons have been shown to play a role in the decision process 
during the dot motion task, it is unlikely that the decision proper is actually computed 
there.  Two observations make this clear.  First, as was mentioned above, if the decision 
process compares the output of pools of directionally selective MT neurons, then some 
other area must carry out the comparison.  Second, the inherent properties of MT neurons 
make them unlikely to be the site of higher level integration.  Specifically, MT neurons 
respond only transiently.  When stimulation is removed, the cells return to base rate.  Yet, 
monkeys can easily perform a version of the dot motion task with an interpolated delay 
period.  Hence, there must be some region that both accumulates signals from MT and 
maintains it across delays.   
 Previous research has suggested that areas such as prefrontal cortex (PFC) contain 
neurons that exhibit just such these qualities (e.g., Fuster & Alexander, 1971).  And, 
certain areas of the PFC (frontal eye fields; FEF; see Tehovnik et al., 2000 for a review) 
as well as parietal cortex (lateral intraparietal area; LIP) are known to be innervated by 
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area MT and play a role in saccade generation (Schall, 2003).  Thus, these sites are likely 
to play a role in the decision process with eye movements as effectors.  Using the dot 
motion task, Kim and Shadlen (1999) examined the time-course of neural activity in the 
FEF.  They found that FEF neurons exhibit properties needed by an accumulator of a 
decision variable.  First, they maintain activity across delays.  Second, their activity is 
time-dependent; unlike MT cells, their firing rate continually grows during motion 
viewing, as if they were accumulating evidence.  And, the rate of this growth is related to 
the strength of the motion signal originating from area MT (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; 
Figure 7, left panel).  Third, responses are produced when activity reaches a fixed 
threshold (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; Figure 7, right panel; see also Hanes & Schall, 
1996).  Finally, and quite importantly, these neurons code the observer’s decision 
regardless of the true direction of motion.  That is, neurons selective for rightward 
decisions become very active in the presence of leftward motion when an error is about to 
be made (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002).  Kim and Shadlen (1999) rested with the 
conclusion that FEF neurons accumulate a difference score from directionally-tuned MT 
neurons.  A response is produced when the accumulating difference score reaches a 
constant threshold.  Computational models show that this is indeed plausible (Mazurek, 
Roitman, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 2003). 
 One further important property concerns the fact that this same type of activity is 
observed even on trials in which a response is not ultimately produced.  For instance, 
Hanes & Schall (1996) recorded from FEF while subjects performed a stop-signal 
paradigm.  On most trials, subjects were to make a saccade towards a peripheral target.  
These trials showed the typical ramping of activity towards a fixed criterion displayed in 
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Figure 7.  On some trials, a stop signal would appear indicating that no response should 
 
Figure 7.  Stimulus-locked (left panel) and response locked (right panel) firing patterns 
for LIP neurons during the dot motion task.  Solid lines depict activity for motion in the 
preferred direction; dotted lines activity for the non-preferred direction.  Note that eye 
movements were produced at a stereotyped level of activity (right panel). 
 
be made.  On these signal trials, they observed that activity begins to ramp, but is 
inhibited a short time after the stop signal.  After estimating response threshold on go 
trials, Hanes and Schall observed that neural activity never reached this level on 
successfully inhibited stop trials but did on non-inhibited stop trials.  This observation 
leads to two important conclusions.  First it proves that this neural activity is not simply 
movement-related, but sensitive to cognitive factors (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004).  If the 
neurons were involved only in movement production, they should show no activity on 
successfully inhibited trials.  Second, it provides a critical prediction regarding the SAT.  
Imagine that due to some SAT manipulation, criterion were lowered so as to stress speed 
over accuracy.  On some stop trials, activity might now reach threshold levels before 
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inhibition set in, leading to an error.   
 The above work is restricted in the sense that recordings were taken from 
circumscribed areas of cortex – area MT, known to be motion sensitive and area FEF and 
LIP known to be important for saccade generation – while presenting a task that produces 
motion stimuli and takes a saccade as a response.  If the accumulation of difference 
scores to threshold is to be regarded as a general mechanism through which decisions are 
produced, it is necessary to show that the same general principles hold in other tasks with 
other response modalities, as well as in other areas of cortex.  This consists of a signal 
generated from specialized areas of sensory cortex (e.g., area MT, somatosensory cortex, 
etc.), and an area that accumulates the difference between pools of these specialized 
sensory neurons (e.g., area FEF, LIP, motor cortex, etc.).  As well, these same general 
principles should be exhibited by other subject populations.  To date, evidence supporting 
this is beginning to emerge.  Neurons in areas of motor cortex, for example, are known to 
represent an evolving decision signal when arm or hand movements are used as effectors 
(Riehle & Requin, 1989; Zhang, Riehle, Requin, & Kornblum, 1997; Salinas & Romo, 
1998; Hernandez, Zainos, & Romo, 2002).  It is also known that motor cortical neurons, 
even in primary motor cortex, receive input from lower-level sensory areas, such as 
somatosensory (Salinas & Romo, 1998) and visual (Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 2000) cortices.   
 Outside the domain of single-unit recordings, one study in particular makes the 
case that the accumulation of difference scores to threshold is a general mechanism. 
Using fMRI, Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, and Ungerleider (2004) applied these ideas 
to human subjects performing a complex object classification task.  Subjects were to 
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classify pictures of faces and houses by button press (2AFC).  Importantly, the images 
were presented amidst varying levels of visual noise.  Some images were presented 
amidst enough visual noise to be nearly subthreshold, while others were presented well 
above threshold, with little or no visual noise.  Previous to performing this task, 
Heekeren, et al. identified, in each subject, areas of ventral temporal cortex that 
responded better to pictures of houses than faces, and other areas that preferred faces over 
houses.  Heekeren et al. made two predictions.  First, if the PFC is indeed important for 
the decision making process, its activity should vary negatively with the amount of visual 
noise embedded within the images.  Stated differently, when pictures are presented with a 
high level of noise, the “evidence” being accumulated is weak; thus any accumulator 
should show a reduced response relative to a trial in which pictures were presented well 
above threshold.  This is conceptually similar to the observation that FEF and LIP 
neurons “ramp up” at a rate dictated by coherence in the dot motion task (Roitman & 
Shadlen, 2002; Hanes & Schall, 1996).  Second, Heekeren et al. reasoned that if the PFC 
accumulated a difference score between pools of selective neurons, as suggested by Kim 
and Shadlen (1999), then PFC activity should correlate positively with the absolute 
difference between house and face-selective areas.  Difficult discriminations (i.e., a small 
difference score) should yield, functionally, a smaller difference in activity between the 
house- and face-selective regions.  Thus, a smaller response would be expected.  Both of 
these hypotheses were supported: the only region found to both 1) correlate negatively 
with visual noise levels and 2) correlate positively with the difference between face- and 
house-selective regions was a region of the dorsolateral PFC. 
The Lateralized Readiness Potential 
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 The Heekeren et al. (2004) study suggests that the accumulation of a difference 
score emanating from pools of specialized neurons may be a general property of decision 
making.  Furthermore, this study makes an important step in extending monkey single-
cell data to human subjects.  However, because fMRI has poor temporal resolution, one 
can not use this methodology to study the SAT.  One cannot accurately determine the 
level of activity at the moment a response is produced.  Essentially, one must be able to 
gauge the level of activity within a very short time window when an overt response is 
emitted.  What is needed is a measure that can ethically be applied to human subjects 
while retaining an approximation to single-cell recordings.  Based on the above review of 
the neural literature, this measure should 1) reflect pools of response-selective neurons, 2) 
reflect the integration of evidence, over time, and 3) be sensitive to parameters inherent in 
sequential-sampling models such as prior probability and criterion.  Research indicates 
that the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) component of the electroencephalogram 
provides such a measure. 
 The LRP is computed as the average voltage difference between electrodes C3 
and C4 in the 10-20 system (Nuwer et al., 1998).  Electrode C3 resides over the left 
hemisphere, displaced laterally from zenith, while C4 resides at the comparable location 
over right hemisphere.  The LRP takes advantage of the fact that the brain is lateralized – 
that is, left-hemisphere cortical areas control the right side of the body, and the converse.  
Thus, on trials where a left hand response is required, the LRP is computed as (C4 – C3); 
on trials where a right hand response is required, (C3 – C4) is used (see Figure 8).  The 
resulting waveform, when negative, reflects preparation of the correct hand; when 
positive, the incorrect hand was prepared.  The subtractive methodology has the 
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additional benefit of removing other event-related potentials unrelated to motor 
preparation.  One is left only with a record of how much more or less active a given 
hemisphere is, relative to the other, across time.  Data from a variety of sources, 
including intracranial recordings and magnetoencephalography confirms that the LRP is 
generated in motor cortex (Coles, Smid, Scheffers, & Otten, 1995, p. 99).  As well, 
single-unit recordings in monkey motor cortex exhibit a nearly identical time course as 
LRP scalp potentials (see Coles, 1989 for a review).  As mentioned previously, motor 
cortical neurons represent an evolving decision, similar to that observed in FEF and LIP.  
Hence, the LRP reflects the difference in activity between pools of neurons selective for 
rightward and leftward movements. 
 19
 
Figure 8.  The derivation of the LRP.  When a left hand response is correct, C4-C3 
produces a negative LRP.  The reverse holds when the right hand is correct.  If an error is 
to be produced (as by preparing the left hand when the right hand is correct), this 
derivation produces a positive LRP. 
 
 The second test, that the LRP is sensitive to integration of evidence over time, is 
also strongly supported.  In one important study, Gratton et al. (1988) presented subjects 
with a response-compatibility paradigm known as the “flanker” task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
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1974).  In this task, subjects viewed strings of 5 letters composed of “H” and “S”, and 
had to respond to the central letter.  Importantly, H’s and S’s were mapped to opposing 
hands.  The relevant data concern performance on incompatible trials, where the central 
letter was surrounded by response-incompatible letters (e.g., HHSHH).  Gratton et al. 
found that at very fast latencies on incompatible trials, responses were more likely to be 
driven by the flanker letters, leading to below chance performance.  The LRP, too, 
closely matched this, tending to drift towards the incorrect hand at fast latencies.  More 
impressively, they showed this pattern even on correct incompatible trials.  Thus, even 
when a trial was eventually responded to correctly, the LRP showed a momentary “dip” 
towards the incorrect hand, suggesting that the LRP indexed the accumulation of 
evidence, over time, in a trial.  
 The third test, that the LRP is sensitive to sequential-sampling parameters is 
backed by at least two important studies.  Gratton et al. (1988) found that overt responses 
were produced at the same level of LRP lateralization, regardless of the RT.  That is, 
whether a trial was responded to quickly or slowly, the response occurred when the LRP 
reached a certain level of lateralization.  It is not difficult to see the relationship between 
this observation and the single-cell data reviewed earlier (e.g., Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; 
Hanes & Schall, 1996).  It appears that overt responses are “triggered” by a stereotyped 
level of neural activity.  This was quite clear in the single-cell studies (Figure 7, right 
panel); the Gratton et al. (1988) study shows that there is an LRP analog of the fixed 
criterion seen in the single-unit research.  This finding has been replicated many times 
since (e.g., Miller, 1998; Mordkoff & Grosjean, 2001). 
 The LRP is also sensitive to prior probability, another important factor in 
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accumulator models.  Miller (1998) presented subjects with a simple 2-choice 
classification experiment.  Importantly, he manipulated the probability of encountering 
the stimuli.  The result of this action was to elicit a “pre-lateralization” of the LRP before 
the critical stimulus even appeared.  It is as if subjects were preparing for the stimulus 
they were led to expect by priming a given hand.  This too, emphasizes the fact that the 
LRP is sensitive to cognitive factors; it is not simply a motor phenomenon. 
 To summarize, mathematical models of the decision process successfully model 
the SAT as a shift in criterion.  With lower criteria, less evidence supporting a given 
alternative is required before making a response, leading to a shorter RT.  Single-unit 
recordings in monkey cortex reveal that sequential-sampling models, as described, are 
biologically plausible.  Each of the 3 critical parameters has a neural correlate: neuron 
activity ramps up at a rate proportional to the quality of evidence, the baseline firing rate 
of neurons is modulated by prior probability, and a response is produced at the precise 
moment neural activity reaches a fixed level, regardless of response latency.  Using the 
LRP, a measure of the relative neural activity emanating from left and right motor cortex, 
research shows many of the same patterns.  The LRP can be “pre-lateralized” by 
manipulating the probability with which one expects a right or left hand response.  Like 
the single-unit data, a response is produced at a stereotyped level of LRP activity, 
regardless of response latency. 
 The study to be reviewed below puts to test the hypotheses that criterion – in the 
neural sense – can be modulated by changes in response deadline.  Response deadlines 
are implemented as a time limit, on each trial, that a subject has to respond.  Deadlines 
are blocked, so that subjects can predict how much time they have on a given trial.  
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Missed deadlines are typically marked by a tone or message that instructs the subjects to 
be faster, even at the expense of accuracy.  Experimental evidence exists confirming that 
enforced response deadlines do in fact affect the SAT (e.g., Rinkenauer et al., 2004).  
 Evidence supporting this hypothesis will take the following forms.  First, like the 
studies previously mentioned, the LRP should exhibit a constant voltage at the moment a 
response is produced, regardless of RT, within a given deadline block.  Thus, holding 
SAT constant holds the LRP threshold constant.  Between deadline blocks, however, 
criterion LRP voltage should be related to the deadline enforced for that block.  LRP 
voltage at response should be lower for shorter deadlines, and higher for longer 
deadlines.  Stated differently, when subjects adopt, for example, an “accuracy” setting, 
allowing for longer latencies, more information may be accrued prior to response.  This is 






 Six subjects were recruited from a pool of Georgia Tech Psychology graduate 
students.  Participants were paid $10.00/hour in a single 3-hour session.  All subjects had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
EEG and EMG Recording 
 Electrophysiological signals were recorded using a BioSemi Active-Two 32-
channel EEG.  Ag/Cl electrodes were securely fastened to the scalp using a nylon cap 
conforming to the modified 10-20 system (Nuwer et al., 1998).  Connections were 
maintained using conductive electrolyte gel (SignaGel).  As the electrodes were “active” 
(each electrode contained its own amplifier), impedances were not an issue.  EEG signals 
were sampled at 1024 Hz, run through an amplifier and ADC converter, and recorded for 
off-line analysis.  No analog filter was employed; all filtering was accomplished digitally 
during off-line analysis. 
 Bipolar electrodes were used to record the electromyogram (EMG) and 
electrooculogram (EOG).  The horizontal EOG (hEOG) provided a measure of eye 
movement artifacts for later removal.  The vertical EOG (vEOG) indicated the presence 
of blinks, which were later removed using an ocular artifact reduction algorithm (Gratton, 
Coles, & Donchin, 1983).  hEOG electrodes were  placed approximately 2-3 cm away 
from the outer canthus of each eye (corresponding to the area commonly known as the 
“temple”).  vEOG electrodes were placed approximately 2-3 cm above and below each 
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subjects’ left eye.  Bipolar electrodes were also used to record EMG activity as a measure 
of response production.  The onset of a manual button press is considerably shorter when 
measured by EMG than when measured by the closing of an electronic circuit.  Some 
estimates of this differential are as small as 17 ms (Mordkoff & Grosjean, 2001), while 
others are as large as 80 ms (present data set).  Thus, EMG provides a more accurate 
measure of response onset.  The placement of bipolar electrodes for EMG varied with 
subject.  For some subjects, the cleanest signal (estimated by eye) was produced by 2 
electrodes placed longitudinally on the inner surface of the wrist, just adjacent to the 
palm (Stern, Ray, & Quigley, 2001).  These electrodes were typically separated by 3-4 
cm, but this was not a constant.  For other subjects, the cleanest EMG signal arose from 
electrodes placed on the outer surface of the hand, with one electrode placed directly on 
the index finger and a reference placed approximately 3-4 cm posterior. 
 EEG, EOG, and EMG signals were band-pass filtered with a low cutoff of .01 Hz 
and a high cutoff of 30 Hz.  As mentioned previously, blink artifacts were regressed out 
by algorithm, while trials with eye movements were rejected (segments with activity 
above or below 75 µV were rejected).  For the stimulus-locked LRP (S-LRP), explained 
in detail below, epochs lasted 800 ms, beginning 100 ms before the critical stimulus.  
Each epoch was baseline-corrected using the average amplitude in the 100 ms window 
prior to the onset of the critical stimulus.  For response-locked LRP (R-LRP), epochs 
lasted 800 ms, beginning 400 ms before manual response and ending 400 ms after 
response.  These waveforms were baseline corrected using the interval 400 ms to 300 ms 
before response onset (Rinkenauer et al., 2004). 
Eriksen Flanker Task 
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 Participants performed a version of the flanker task originally developed by 
Eriksen and Eriksen (1974).  The task parameters were quite similar to that reported by 
Heitz & Engle (in-press).  Subjects viewed sequences of 5 letters, composed only of H 
and/or S characters.  Subjects were to indicate, by button press, the identity of the central 
letter.  If the center letter was S, subjects pushed the “z” key with their left hand, while 
the “m” key was pressed if the center letter was H.  On compatible trials, all letters were 
identical (HHHHH or SSSSS).  On incompatible trials, the outer letters were consistent 
with the incorrect response (HHSHH or SSHSS).  A fixation dot above the central letter 
was always visible before the array appeared to aid in localization.  Stimuli were 
presented in light gray against a black background. 
 Each trial began with the presentation of a 50 ms warning tone, followed 1000 ms 
later by the critical stimulus, subtending approximately 2.5 degrees of visual angle.  The 
critical array remained visible until button press or 1500 ms.  Following response, a 
random interval of 1000 or 1500 ms preceded the onset of the next trial.   
 The SAT manipulation was enforced by three response deadlines.  The slow 
condition used a 550 ms deadline, the medium a 450 ms deadline, and the fast a 375 ms 
deadline.  These deadlines were selected based on pilot testing and previous research 
using this task (Heitz & Engle, in press).  Deadlines were enforced by presenting the 
message “Deadline missed…Faster!” after each RT that surpassed the designated cutoff.  
Critically, subjects did not know if a deadline was missed or not until after making a 
response; in other words, subjects were allowed to make a 600 ms response even in the 
375 ms deadline.  The stimulus remained visible for a maximum of 1500 ms.  To ensure 
that subjects did not disregard the deadline messages, the program kept a running total of 
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the proportion of missed deadlines.  Every 10 trials, this average was checked.  If the 
proportion of missed deadlines fell under 66%, a new message appeared for 5 seconds: 
“You are missing too many deadlines.  You must respond faster even if errors result.” 
 Prior to beginning the experiment, subjects were informed of the meaning of SAT 
and were told that they would be tested at three levels of speed stress.  They were told to 
attempt to “move” along the SAT continuum, even if the response deadlines did not 
appear to change.  Following this and general instructions, subjects performed 20 trials of 
mapping practice, which familiarized them with the response-mapping.  Only compatible 
trials were presented during mapping practice and feedback was provided immediately 
after response.  Next, subjects began the experimental block.  Although it was not 
detectable to the subject, the first 20 trials of the first block were considered “deadline 
practice.”  This allowed subjects to learn what time-band they were expected to respond 
in.  No feedback was provided in the experimental block.  Subjects completed 5 blocks of 
trials at the slow deadline, 5 blocks at the medium deadline, and 5 blocks at the fast 
deadline, in that order.  While this led to the confounding of SAT with practice, there is 
good reason to structure the task in this manner.  First, it is unclear whether or not 
subjects can easily return to a slow cognitive set after performing hundreds of trials in 
comparably faster cognitive sets.  Thus, as a starting point, it makes sense to begin with 
the slow condition and gradually increase speed stress.  Second, unpublished work has 
revealed that the peak voltage of the LRP is unaffected by extensive practice (up to 4 
hours; personal communication with Gabriele Gratton, 6 February, 2007). 
 Each block of trials consisted of 120 trials: 60 of which were compatible and 60 
of which were incompatible (50/50).  Of these, half were left hand responses and half 
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were right hand responses.  Because each block was run 5 times in each speed stress 
condition, this led to a total of 150 trials/SAT condition/compatibility condition/hand.  
Hence, the total number of experimental trials was 1800.  Trials were coded for SAT 
condition, compatibility condition, correct/incorrect, made or missed deadline, and 
left/right hand. 
Results 
 Primarily, averaged data shall be reported in the main text, but abbreviated 
subject-level data are presented in Appendix A.  With few exceptions, similar patterns 
were evident at the subject-level.  Thus, the reader can be assured that the below patterns 
do not arise from an aggregation bias, nor are they carried by a small set of subjects.  The 
data will be presented in two main sections; the first presents RT and accuracy rate 
analyses including time-course decomposition (Heitz & Engle, in press) and model fits to 
the LATER sequential-sampling model (Carpenter & Williams, 1995).  The main 
purpose of this first section is to establish that the deadline manipulation successfully 
induced a speed-accuracy tradeoff and to demonstrate that the patterns are consistent with 
the sequential sampling models described above.  The second section presents 
electrophysiological analyses, focusing on the LRP. 
Behavioral Data 
Data were first structured to support a time-course analysis, to be reported later.  
To do so, a Vincentizing procedure was used: Each subject’s RT was rank-ordered 
separately for each compatibility and SAT condition.  Ten ntile bins were then computed, 
the first bin corresponding to the fastest 10% of trials, the second bin to the next fastest 
10% of trials, and so forth.  The analyses to be reported below were run in the context of 
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a 2 (compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) x 3 (SAT: fast, medium, slow) x 10 (RT 
bin) repeated-measures ANOVA.  Huynh-Feldt corrections were employed for violations 
of sphericity. 
The speed-accuracy tradeoff was apparent in the behavioral data (i.e., RT and 
accuracy rate) as reflected in Table 1.  Subject-level data are presented in Table A1 and 
A2.   
Table 1. 
Mean RT (ms) and Accuracy Rate by Compatibility and SAT 
Condition  Slow Med Fast 
RT 433 377 320 Compatible 
ACC .96 .88 .74 
RT 477 400 325 Incompatible 
ACC .83 .66 .50 
 
 For RT, there was a main effect of SAT condition, F(2,10) = 110.79, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .96, and a main effect of compatibility, F(1,10) = 34.45, p < .01, partial η2 = 
.87.  Repeated contrasts revealed that the fast condition was significantly faster than the 
med condition, F(1,10) = 102.63, p < .001, partial η2 = .95, and the med condition was 
significantly faster than the slow condition, F(1,10) = 69.72, p < .001, partial η2 = .93.  
The main effect of compatibility, reported above, is commonly known as the “flanker 
effect” and reflects the slowing of incompatible responses due to response conflict 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974).  There was also a compatibility x SAT interaction, F(2,10) = 
37.86, p < .001, partial η2 = .8; as Table 1 suggests, the effect of SAT condition in 
slowing RTs was somewhat stronger for incompatible than compatible trials.  Similar 
patterns were evident for accuracy rate: There was a main effect of SAT condition, 
F(2,10) = 98.60, p < .001, partial η2 = .95, indicating that accuracy rates tended to decline 
as speed stress increased.  Evident also was a main effect of compatibility, F(1,10) = 
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88.52, p < .01, partial η2 = .95, indicating that incompatible trials were less accurate than 
compatible trials.  Unlike the RT analyses, the SAT x compatibility interaction did not 
attain significance for accuracy rate. 
 It is worthy of mention that the mean accuracy rate for the fast-incompatible 
condition is .50 (see Table 1).  Generally, this might be taken as evidence that subjects 
were randomly guessing.  However, there is good reason to doubt this supposition.  First, 
if subjects were randomly guessing in this condition, it stands to reason that the accuracy 
rate for compatible trials should also approach .50.  It is difficult to envision a situation 
where subjects randomly guess only on incompatible trials.  Second, as will be shown in 
the below time-course analyses, accuracy rates for incompatible trials typically fall below 
chance during a specific time-band (Gratton et al., 1988; Heitz & Engle, in press) and 
then recover to .50 a bit later.  Below chance performance reflects a process that is 
accumulating useful information (i.e., subjects are not guessing), but at the point of 
response, contains more evidence in favor of the incorrect response than the correct 
response (see Heitz & Engle, in press, for a review).  The RT associated with .50 
performance (325 ms) is consistent with the “recovery” time-band in previous research. 
Latency Distributions 
  Figures 9 and 10 present latency distributions for compatible and incompatible 
trials, respectively, as a function of SAT condition.  Observations < 150 ms were 
discarded from analyses as anticipations.  Doing so eliminated less than .005% of the 
data.  The upper panels depict correct trial latencies, the bottom panels error latencies.   
 
 













Compatible Fast: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines























Compatible Medium: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines













Compatible Medium: Correct Made & Missed Deadlines













Compatible Slow: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines
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Incompatible Fast: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines












Incompatible Med: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines













Incompatible Fast: Correct Made & Missed Deadlines




















Incompatible Medium: Correct Made & Missed Deadlines



















Incompatible Fast: Correct Made & Missed Deadlines
Figure 10. Incompatible correct (upper row) and incorrect (lower row) latency distributions.
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Although it is impossible to measure exactly one’s internal response criterion 
using behavioral data alone, it is possible to glean some information regarding its 
properties.  It is thought that one sets their response criteria in such a way as to maximize 
reinforcement rate (Lo & Wang, 2007; Shadlen & Newsome, 2002; Bogatz, 2007; Bogatz 
et al., 2006).  In the present context, an optimal response criterion would allow for as 
much processing time as possible (ensuring an accurate response) while beating the 
deadline on a large proportion of trials.  Presented in Table 2 are the mean proportion 
missed deadlines along with the median RT associated with made and missed deadlines 
for each SAT condition.   
Table 2. 
% Missed Deadlines and Median RT (ms) for Made and Missed Trials: Experiment 1 
Condition Slow (dead = 550) Med (dead = 450) Fast (dead = 375) 
4.7% 10.1% 16.9% Compatible 422 590 368 474 312 404 
15.4% 24.1% 22% Incompatible 463 593 376 484 306 413 
 
Given the nontrivial proportion of missed deadlines, it is reasonable to suggest that 
subjects tended to use as much time as they were allotted.  In other words, their criterion 
was set in such a way as to use as much processing time as possible while allowing for 
some acceptable proportion of missed deadlines.  Although it would have been possible 
for subjects to adopt a criterion that beat the deadline on all trials, this would come at a 
cost of accuracy due to a loss in processing time.  A 2 (compatibility) x 3 (SAT 
condition) ANOVA confirmed that the proportion of missed deadlines was larger for 
incompatible than compatible trials, F(1,5) = 28.63, p < .01, partial η2 = .85 and tended to 
increase with speed stress, F(2,10) = 11.05, p < .05, partial η2 =.689.  A compatibility x 
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SAT quadratic interaction reflects the fact that missed deadlines were about equally likely 
in the incompatible med and incompatible slow conditions, but monotonically increased 
for compatible trials, F(2,10) = 4.60, p < .05, partial η2 = .48. 
Conditional Accuracy Functions 
 Conditional accuracy functions (CAFs) plot accuracy rate conditional on RT 
(Wood & Jennings, 1976).  These plots depict how performance changes within a 
condition due to variability in processing time, and will provide some indication of 
whether or not subjects adopted different response criteria in the different SAT 
conditions.  One can readily assess the extent to which SAT criteria changed by 
comparing accuracy rates at a given RT.  When response criteria change, then the 
accuracy rate associated with an RT of, say, 500 ms will be dependent on SAT condition, 
decreasing as speed stress increases.  Alternatively, if the deadline manipulation was 
ineffective, accuracy rates should be identical, holding RT constant (i.e., the accuracy 
rate associated with 500 ms will be the same in the fast, med, and slow conditions). 
Figure 11 depicts these functions for compatible trials.  The CAFs are presented 
in the upper panel of Figure 11; the lower panel plots observed RT as a function of ntile 
bin and SAT condition.  Comparable plots for incompatible trials are presented in Figure 
12.  To analyze the upper-panel CAFs using ANOVA, it must first be established that it is 
tenable that the latency distributions are equal between the latency bins.  In other words, 
an ANOVA assumes that the data points for each CAF (i.e., for the fast, med, and slow 
lines) are aligned with respect to the x-axis.  If this is not the case, then ANOVA is 























































































Figure 11.  Upper panel: Conditional accuracy functions for compatible trials.  
Horizontal bars depict + 1 S.E.M for RT, vertical bars depict the same for accuracy rate.  







































Figure 12.  Upper panel: Conditional accuracy functions for incompatible trials.  
Horizontal bars depict + 1 S.E.M for RT, vertical bars depict the same for accuracy rate.  
Lower panel: Latency bin RTs.  Vertical bars depict + 1 S.E.M. 















































A brief look at Figures 11 and 12, however, indicate that this is sure to be a problem; the 
data points vary quite widely along the x-axis.  This is confirmed by a RT bin x 
compatibility x SAT interaction F(18,90) = 3.31, p = .051, partial η2 = .40, although the 
main effect of SAT condition on RT, reported earlier, is sufficient to render ANOVA 
inappropriate.  In lieu of omnibus tests, t-tests were used to evaluate specific mean 
contrasts, while the Friedman nonparametric test was used as a surrogate for a one-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA. 
Considering first the compatible trials, two observations are noteworthy.  First, 
accuracy rates tend to increase with processing time, as would be expected.  Second, the 
accuracy rate associated with a given RT is dependent on the SAT condition.  This was 
verified statistically using the Friedman nonparametric test.  Three approximate time 
points were chosen that appeared to contain data from all three SAT conditions.  The first 
test corresponded to an RT of between 430 and 450 (slow bin 6, med bin 9, fast bin 10).  
This test was significant, χ2 (2) = 9.33, p < .01.  The second test considered RTs between 
370 and 385 ms (slow bin 2, med bin 6, fast bin 8); this test was also significant, χ2 (2) = 
8.82, p < .05.  Finally, RTs between 340 and 342 were tested (slow bin 1, med bin 3, fast 
bin 7), however this test was not significant χ2 (2) = 4.26, ns, likely due to the overlap 
between the slow and med condition at this point. 
 Incompatible CAFs showed similar patterns: Performance gradually increased 
over time, and performance levels at a given RT were dependent on SAT condition.  
Verifying what is evident in Figure 12, a Friedman nonparametric test considering slow 
bin 5, med bin 9, and fast bin 10 (RTs between 465 and 475 ms) yielded significance, χ2 
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(2) = 7.04 p < .05, as did a similar test within an RT time band of 368 – 370 ms (slow bin 
2, med bin 4, and fast bin 8), χ2 (2) = 6.33, p < .05.  Also noteworthy is the “dip” below 
chance performance evident for half of the fast condition and bins 1 and 2 of the med 
condition.  As mentioned previously, this pattern is suggestive of a process that has begun 
to accumulate useful information, but has not yet filtered incompatible distractor letters 
which tend to lead to the opposite response (Heitz & Engle, in press).  This pattern was 
significant for the first RT bin in the fast condition, t(5) = -2.78, p < .05 and for the med 
condition, t(5) = -3.38, p < .05.  That it was the first bin that fell below chance is 
noteworthy.  In particular, it indicates that the .50 accuracy rate observed later (bins 2-5 
for the fast condition and bins 1-3 for the med condition) are not indicative of random 
guesses.  Rather, it is simply that at these time points, interference from incompatible 
distractors balances the information from the target letter. 
 To summarize the above, mean comparisons and time-course analyses suggest 
that the deadline manipulation did in fact alter subjects’ response criteria.  However, this 
does not specifically speak to how these data are accommodated by a sequential sampling 
process.  As mentioned in the introduction, sequential sampling models make specific 
predictions regarding how criterion shifts should affect latency distributions.  The next 
section considers fits to the LATER model (Carpenter & Williams, 1995).  
LATER Model  
 Behavioral data (for correct trials only) were fit to the LATER model (Carpenter 
& Williams, 1995) using SPIC software (Carpenter, 2007).  The LATER model is a 
linear rise-to-threshold model that has been used extensively to dissociate manipulations 
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that affect drift rate and manipulations that affect criterion (Carpenter & Williams, 1995; 
Reddi & Carpenter, 2000; Reddi, Asrress, & Carpenter, 2003; Hanes & Carpenter, 1999).  
The fitting procedure is straightforward but makes use of a plot known as a “reciprobit.”  
As this is a non-intuitive method of data presentation, some description is warranted.  The 
first step in deriving a reciprobit stems from the observation that RT distributions 
generally follow a Gaussian distribution when they are plotted on a reciprocal scale.  As a 
rule, latency distributions plotted on a normal scale have a positive skew, leading many to 
argue that they are best fit by an exponential-Gaussian rather than the Normal (Spieler, 
Balota, & Faust, 2000).  After converting the x-axis to a reciprocal scale, the distribution 
is transformed into a cumulative density function (CDF) on a probit scale.  Essentially, 
the probit scale “stretches” the CDF into a straight line (Figure 13). 
The LATER model makes predictions at the distribution level, but is inferior to 
more developed models such as the diffusion (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998), 
as it cannot account for error latencies or error rates.  However, the LATER model has 
been heralded for its ease of use, ability to fit many data sets, and clearly dissociate 
criterion effects from drift rate effects.  Manipulations that affect drift rate (e.g., the 
perceptual quality of the stimuli) have the effect of changing the skew of a latency 
distribution when plotted on a traditional scale.  On reciprobit, a manipulation that affects 
drift rate will cause a horizontal, parallel shift of lines.  Hence, if two lines are laterally 
shifted, while slope remains invariant, the effect was in drift rate.  Manipulations that 
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Figure 13.  The effect of changes in drift rate and threshold on the reciprobit plot (From 
Reddi, Asress, & Carpenter, 2003).  Upper left: The shape and placement of a latency 
distribution is a function of both drift rate and criterion.  Lower left: A reciprobit plot.  
The median of the distribution intercepts the 50% cumulative frequency.  Upper right: 
changes in threshold causes a reciprobit “swivel.”  Lower right: changes in drift rate 
causes a reciprobit “shift.” 
 
affect the distance between baseline and criterion (as in a rising or lowering criterion) 
tend to exert its effect primarily on the placement of the response time distribution.  On 
reciprobit, this leads to a “swiveling” of lines about a constant intercept.  In other words, 
the slopes will change (Figure 13).  Previous research (Reddi & Carpenter, 2000; Reddi, 
Asress, & Carpenter, 2003; Hanes & Carpenter, 1999) shows that manipulations such as 
SAT instructions lead to reciprobit “swivel,” whereas manipulations such as stimulus 
discriminability lead to reciprobit “shift.”  The “shifting” versus “swiveling” model 
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Figure 14.  Reciprobit plot for compatible trials.  The swiveling of the lines about a 
common intercept is consistent with a change in criterion/threshold. 
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Figure 15.  Reciprobit plots for incompatible trials.  The swiveling of the lines about a 
common intercept is consistent with a change in criterion/threshold. 
 
is specifically tested using a log likelihood ratio test (implemented in SPIC software, 
Carpenter, 2007).  Figures 14 and 15 present reciprobit plots for compatible and 
incompatible trials, respectively.  As is evident, the SAT manipulation invoked a 
reciprobit “swivel,” indicating a change in criterion/threshold, for both compatible and 
incompatible trials.  These observations were confirmed by log likelihood ratio test, for 
compatible trials, LLR = 17959, p < .001; for incompatible trials, LLR = 15106, p < .001.  
This held when tested on a subject-level as well (see Appendix for subject-level tests and 
plots).   
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 The above behavioral data are in agreement that the deadline manipulation 
affected subjects’ criterion placement.  As subjects were pushed to respond faster, 
criterion was lowered, leading to a decrease in RT but also an increase in error rate.  
LATER model fits were also consistent with the hypothesis that subjects accumulate 
information over time until a critical threshold (criterion) is reached, at which point a 
response is emitted.  The deadline manipulation had the effect of lowering or raising this 
criterion, as evidenced by reciprobit “swivel.” 
 Although these results are interesting in and of themselves, they are not altogether 
surprising.  A long history of research has shown comparable effects of deadline 
manipulations and fits to the LATER model and other sequential sampling models (e.g., 
diffusion, leaky accumulator, etc.).  The next section addresses the primary question of 
interest – namely, is there a neural correlate of SAT, and can it be observed to move in 
predictable ways?  The argument is that the LRP is a measure of evidence accumulation; 
its amplitude at response is a measure of criterion/threshold.  The theory of continuous 
flow (Eriksen & Schultz, 1979) argues that response channels are continually primed as 
information is accumulated (Gratton et al., 1988).  Because the LRP reflects the priming 
of motor cortex preceding a hand movement, it stands to reason that the LRP reflects this 
accumulation process.  Specifically, the prediction was that the threshold for movement 
onset, as measured by the voltage of the LRP at the point EMG activity is detected, 
should decrease as speed-stress increases.  This follows from the hypothesis that as 
criterion lowers, less information is required before a response is emitted.  It is for this 
reason that errors are more likely to result in a high speed-stress environment. 
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Electrophysiological Data 
 LRPs were derived for each combination of compatibility, SAT, correct versus 
incorrect, and made versus missed deadlines.  Stable LRPs are achieved with 
approximately 60 trials/hand (Rinkenauer et al., 2004).  Although the number of 
observations per hand for each condition was large (150), there were many instances 
where too few observations were collected to derive an LRP.  These instances primarily 
concerned incorrect compatible trials and compatible trials with missed deadlines.  All 
waveforms include only made deadlines, unless otherwise noted.  All LRPs were 
computed so that correct activation results in a positive deflection, while incorrect 
activity produces a negative deflection. 
EMG Onset Detection 
 The present research is primarily concerned with what are known as response-
locked LRPs (R-LRP).  The R-LRPs presented here consist of an epoch lasting 400 ms 
before and after response onset.  Time 0 is thus the point of response.  The LRP, although 
known as a “slow” potential, lasts only a few hundred milliseconds.  Thus, accurately 
measuring the exact moment of response onset is problematic; if measurement of this 
moment is in any way delayed, the estimated measure of LRP amplitude needed for 
response production is flawed.  For this reason, EMG activity was used to time-lock R-
LRPs.  EMG onset detection was accomplished by establishing, for each subject and each 
hand, a criterion voltage that clearly differentiated muscle activity from baseline noise.  
Although this criterion was unsystematically determined by eye, EMG activity tends to 





















Figure 16.  A typical single-trial EMG.  For this example, a criterion voltage of 
approximately 50 µV would reliably dissociate background noise from muscle activity. 
 
to when it began (see Figure 16).  For one subject (subj #3), EMG results were 
contaminated by a tendency to produce a finger extension just prior to finger flexion.  
This introduced a noticeable yet smaller peak approximately 50 ms before the “main” 
flexion peak.  Unfortunately, these movements were idiosyncratic and occurred on only 
some trials.  For this reason, EMG onset detection was accomplished by hand for this 
subject.  On average, EMG medians were 75.3 ms faster than RTs.  To illustrate, Table 3 
presents EMG and RT medians as a function of compatibility and SAT condition (for 




Median EMG versus RT  and (standard deviation): Correct & Deadline Met 
 Slow (dead = 550) Med (dead = 450) Fast (dead = 375) 
 EMG RT EMG RT EMG RT 
Compatible 347 (85) 422 (51) 295 (62) 371 (45) 248 (57) 319 (48) 
Incompatible 389 (94) 467 (52) 307 (73) 387 (55) 237 (58) 309 (53) 
 
Compatible and Incompatible Correct R-LRPs 
 Figure 17 and 18 present, respectively, grand average R-LRP waveforms for 
compatible and incompatible trials (see Appendix for subject-level plots).  It is 
immediately obvious that the predicted patterns emerge: The LRP amplitude is higher in 
the slow condition, somewhat lower in the med condition, and smallest in the fast 
condition.  This pattern emerges for both the compatible and incompatible trials.  As 
well, LRP amplitude at response onset is similar across compatibility conditions for each 
level of SAT (e.g., the criterion voltage for the slow condition is similar for compatible 
and incompatible trials).  A 2 (compatibility) x 3 (SAT) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to verify these trends.  Consistent with what is apparent in Figures 17 and 18, 
there was a main effect of SAT condition, F(2,10) = 14.23, p < .01, partial η2 = .74.  
Main effect contrasts revealed that the med condition was marginally lower than the slow 
condition F(1,5) = 5.02, p < .08, partial η2 = .50, and the fast condition was significantly 
lower than the med condition, F(1,5) = 29.09, p < .01, partial η2 = .85.  Consistent with 
the observation that criterion voltage is similar across compatibility conditions and SAT 











































Compatible and Incompatible Median Splits 
As mentioned in the introduction, previous research has shown a constant LRP 
threshold within a given SAT setting (Gratton et al., 1988; Mordkoff & Grosjean, 2001).  
To see if this held true, subjects’ RTs were median split separately for compatible and 
incompatible trials for each SAT condition.  Figures 19 and 20 present these data.  For 
the slow condition, it is quite clear that LRP threshold is identical for the fast and slow 
halves.  Though the slow condition was technically speeded in that a deadline was 
enforced, it may be similar to a condition that did not enforce a deadline.  Thus, 
consistent with previous research (Gratton et al., 1988; Mordkoff & Grosjean, 2001), a 
constant criterion is observed for both fast and slow trials.  However, the story is not so 
clear when considering the med and fast SAT conditions.  Plots of these data seem to 
suggest that the threshold is lower for the fast half of the median split.  A 2 
(compatibility) x 2 (median: first vs. second half) x 3 (SAT) repeated-measures ANOVA 
revealed that, indeed, there was a marginal main effect of median, F(1,5) = 5.32, p < .07, 
partial η2 = .52, and a main effect of SAT, F(2,10) = 13.75, partial η2 = .73, although no 
interactions emerged.  It should be noted that although the grand averages in Figures  19 
and 20 are rather clear, on a subject level, the effect is idiosyncratic.  This is at least 
partially due to the loss in signal-to-noise ratio incurred when performing a median split.  
It was not uncommon for the fast condition to yield only 20-25 observations/hand 
(sometimes less); it is known that stable LRPs are attained with a minimum of more than 
double that number (Rinkenauer, et al., 2004).  Unsystematic review of the subject-level 
median split R-LRPs revealed that the first half tended to be “noisier” than the second 
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half, though the basis for this is unclear. 
The fact that the second half of trials led to smaller waveforms in the med and fast 
conditions is problematic for two major reasons.  First, it invalidates a strict version of 
the constant criterion hypothesis.  Rather, there are small shifts in this amplitude due to a 
trials’ latency (i.e., fast half vs. slow half).  This may reflect what some have called the 
“micro-SAT” (Osman et al., 2000; Rinkenauer et al., 2004; Wickelgren, 1977).  
Accordingly, response criteria vary widely by SAT (“macro-SAT”) condition, but also 
vary on a trial-by-trial basis due to momentary fluctuations in criteria (“micro-SAT”).  
Faster trials involve a somewhat lower threshold and slower trials a higher threshold.  
Second, and more damaging to the central thesis, one could suggest that the pattern 
depicted in Figures 17 and 18 is an artifact of the introduction of more and more “guess” 
trials as speed stress increases.  Although the CAF data reported above suggest that low 
accuracy rates were not due to random guessing, it remains possible that some trials were 
random (i.e., the response was predetermined), and that these trials contaminated the R-
LRPs presented above.  Rinkenauer et al. (2004) have developed a sophisticated method 
by which the influence of such fast guess trials can be removed from the LRP waveforms.  
One is then left with so-called “subject controlled” LRPs, free from any contamination 
due to guessing. However, this procedure is based on the “fast guess” model (Ollman, 
1966), which the authors themselves admit is wrong (p. 262).  The fast guess model holds 
that subjects produce either slow responses with high accuracy or guess responses at 
chance accuracy.  The SAT results by changing the mixture of subject controlled and 
guess trials.  In a high speed-stress condition, it is thought that a larger 
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Figure 19.  Grand average R-LRP waveforms after median split for compatible trials.   
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Figure 20.  Grand average R-LRP waveforms after median split for incompatible trials. 
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proportion of trials are guesses, which serve to lower accuracy rate and speed mean RT.  
Research has shown that this model is untenable.  For instance, it cannot accommodate 
the observation that error RTs are often slower than correct RTs.  The most serious 
problem in using the fast guess model as a basis for LRP correction stems from the 
necessary assumption that errors are due primarily, if not solely, to guess responses 
(which will be correct 50% of the time and incorrect 50% of the time).  By estimating the 
LRP waveform elicited by errors (which are by definition guesses), Rinkenauer et al. 
(2004) argues that the influence of guesses can be removed from the so-called subject 
controlled waveforms.  However, as argued above and elsewhere (Heitz & Engle, in 
press), error responses need not be guesses – errors are reflective of the type of 
information accumulated thus far in a trial.  It is for that reason that accuracy rates drop 
below chance on incompatible flanker trials (see Figure 12). 
Because of these difficulties, a different approach was used to remove the 
possible contamination of guess responses.  One need only assume that guess responses, 
when they occur, tend to be faster than non-guess trials.  This is a reasonable assumption 
and is backed by time-course analyses (Heitz & Engle, in press; Gratton et al., 1988).  
Hence, if we look only at the second half of each median split, they should be relatively 
uncontaminated from guess trials.  Figure 21 depicts the second half for compatible and 
incompatible trials, respectively.  It is evident that the same general pattern emerges 
when considering only the second half of each median split.  Thus, it is unlikely that the 
overall pattern is due to an increasing contamination due to guess trials.  A 2 
(compatibility) x 3 (SAT) ANOVA confirmed a 
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Figure 21. Grand average R-LRP waveforms including only the second (slower) half of a 
median split on RT.  Upper panel depicts compatible trials, lower panel, incompatible 
trials. 
 
main effect of SAT, F(2,10) = 4.33, p < .05, partial η2 =.46.  As before, there was no 
main effect or interaction involving compatibility. 
 Though this alleviates some of the concern for potential confounds in the overall 
pattern, it does not eliminate the possibility that some random guess trials contaminated 
R-LRPs (particularly, for the first half of each median split).  This could be responsible 
for the lower amplitudes observed in the 1st half of each median split in the med and fast 
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blocks.  Despite the fact that it is impossible to determine with any certainty which trials 
were guesses and which trials were simply inaccurate, it is possible to speculate on how 
they could potentially contaminate the LRP.  In a strict sense, it is unlikely that a true 
guess trial would elicit no LRP.  Although there may be little cognitive processing behind 
such trials, they still require a manual response; thus, an LRP must be produced.  
Contamination, however, can result from the combination of two factors: baseline 
correction of the R-LRP coupled with advance preparation of a response channel. 
 If we assume that a true guess is produced by pre-selecting a response prior to 
stimulus onset, it is reasonable to suggest that subjects also prepare that response (hand) 
prior to stimulus onset.  Gratton et al. (1988) presented such evidence: trials that were 
responded to extremely quickly with chance accuracy showed advance lateralization of 
the LRP.  This becomes problematic in light of the methods used to derive R-LRPs.  To 
derive an R-LRP, one must perform some type of baseline correction.  In other words, the 
beginning of the waveform is set to 0; this corrects for unrelated voltage changes (e.g., 
electrical noise, skin conductance changes, etc.).  Here, the baseline was computed as the 
average activity 400 to 300 ms before response onset.  Hence, if guess trials were already 
pre-lateralized, baseline correcting these waveforms would make them appear artificially 
small.  One way to deal with this would be to use a baseline correction well before the 
stimulus onset.  To do so, R-LRPs for the compatible fast condition were re-computed 
(due to a timing issue, Subject 3 had to be left out of this analysis).  Instead of baseline 
correcting 400 to 300 ms prior to response, a 100 ms period following the onset of the 
warning tone was used.  Recall that each trial began with the presentation of a warning 
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tone, followed 1000 ms later by the critical stimulus.  If the smaller R-LRPs in the fast 
condition were due to pre-lateralization, then using this new baseline correct should 
drastically increase fast R-LRPs.  Figure 22 shows the results of this analysis. 















Baseline Correct -400 to -300 ms Before
Response
Baseline Correct on Warning Tone (-1000
ms Before Stimulus)
 
Figure 22.  Red line: original baseline correction (-400 to -300 prior to response).  Blue 
line: new baseline period approximately 1000 ms before stimulus onset. 
 
 
It is evident that the smaller R-LRPs observed in the fast condition are not due to pre-
lateralization.  Had this occurred, then correcting this baseline (Figure 22, blue line) 
should have led to a much larger R-LRP.  A paired t-test confirmed that the amplitude at 
response onset was statistically equivalent for both baseline periods. 
Incorrect Responses 
 The question of what produces an error response is interesting, and one that 
continues to be addressed by sequential-sampling models.  In the diffusion model, an 
error is produced when the information accumulation function approaches the wrong 
boundary, perhaps due to noise in the processing system or noise deriving from the 
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signal.  It is often assumed (but not required) that the boundaries for each response 
alternative are equidistant from the starting point.  Accordingly, error trials must be 
produced when the accumulation function reaches the same threshold level, but opposite 
in sign (i.e., in the wrong direction).  Figure 23 and 24 depict the waveforms for 
compatible and incompatible trials in the med and fast conditions (there were too few 
observations in the slow condition). 
 
 


























Figure 23.  Grand average R-LRP waveforms for the compatible med and fast conditions.  



































Figure 24. Grand average R-LRP waveforms for the incompatible med and fast 
conditions.  Positive deflections depict correct trials, negative deflections incorrect trials. 
 
 
 As Figures 23 and 24 show, the voltages at response onset are remarkably similar 
for correct and incorrect trials, but flipped in sign.  Considering first compatible trials, the 
mean respective correct and incorrect voltages were as follows: med (correct = 3.5 µV; 
incorrect = -3.0 µV), fast (correct = 2.3 µV; incorrect = -2.4 µV).  Similar patterns 
emerge for incompatible trials: med (correct = 3.3 µV; incorrect = -3.2 µV), fast (correct 
= 2.4 µV; incorrect = -2.9 µV).  Consistent with these observations, all t-tests comparing 
correct and incorrect voltages were non-significant. 
Missed Deadlines 
To restate the present model, the onset of a critical stimulus begins an evidence 
accumulation process.  This accumulation process continues until it reaches some critical 
threshold, at which point a response is emitted.  As we have shown above, this threshold 
is related to SAT condition and hence, the amount of evidence accumulated before 
making a response.  One critical prediction following this model concerns missed 
deadlines.  Particularly, it should be the case that missed deadlines rise to the same 
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threshold as made deadlines, only later in time.  Stated differently, the reason one misses 
a deadline is due to the fact that the information function reached threshold after the 
response deadline.  This prediction can be addressed using a combination of R- and S-
locked LRPs.  Because subjects missed deadlines on only a fraction of trials (and this 
fraction had to be split between right and left hands to derive an LRP), the only 
conditions that could be analyzed were correct trials from the incompatible condition.  
Figures 25, 26, and 27 present these data for the slow, med, and fast conditions, 
respectively. 



















Figure 25.  Grand average R-LRPs for correct incompatible trials in the slow condition. 
 
 58

















Figure 26.  Grand average R-LRPs for correct incompatible trials in the med condition. 
















Figure 27.  Grand average R-LRPs for correct incompatible trials in the med condition. 
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 What should be evident in Figures 25-27 is that, consistent with predictions, both 
made and missed deadlines have identical thresholds for response.  This was confirmed 
statistically in a 2 (2: deadline: made vs. missed) x 3 (SAT) repeated measures ANOVA.  
Though there was the expected decline in amplitude due to SAT condition, F(1,10) = 
25.4, p < .001, partial η2 = .84, no other effects attained significance (all Fs < 1.0).  These 
data suggest that subjects miss a deadline because evidence accumulation reaches 
threshold at a time point after the deadline has passed. 
 To further show how missed deadlines were delayed in time relative to made 
deadlines, Figure 28 presents S-LRPs for incompatible correct trials.  S-LRPs are useful 
for assessing timing issues (i.e., at what point did the LRP begin to rise?), but are less 
amenable to hypotheses regarding voltage at response onset.  The reason for this, to put it 
succinctly, is that the voltages associated with R-LRPs (which we have just dealt with at 
length above) become “smeared” due to averaging when they are locked to stimulus 
onset.  Thus, the resulting S-LRP need not resemble the R-LRP for the same condition.  
Despite these inadequacies, S-LRPs presented in Figure 28 exhibit interesting 
characteristics.  Two characteristics of these plots are noteworthy.  First, the S-LRP for 
missed deadlines is much delayed with respect to made deadlines.  Second, missed 
deadlines exhibit a prominent decrease in voltage prior to peak amplitude.  This is often 
observed when subjects begin to prepare the incorrect hand, then recover, and produce 
the correct response (Gratton et al., 1988).  This would be expected on incompatible 
trials, as the distractor letters may, on occasion, exert enough influence that the incorrect 
response channel is primed, causing a delay in response. 
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Figure 28.  S-LRPs for made and missed deadlines in the fast (top panel), med 
(middlepanel), and fast (bottom panel) conditions.   
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Discussion 
 The rich dataset just described may be boiled down to a few critical points.  First, 
the behavioral data are abundantly clear that the deadline manipulation did, in fact, affect 
subjects’ response criterion.  Not only did mean RT and accuracy rate decline as speed 
stress increased, but CAFs showed that accuracy rates, holding RT constant, were 
dependent on SAT condition.  Furthermore, RT data were well described by a “swivel” 
operation of the reciprobit.  In accord with the LATER model (Carpenter & Williams, 
1995), this is representative of a change in response criteria.   
 Second, and most critically for the present work, the amplitude of the LRP at 
EMG onset was related to SAT condition.  Consistent with predictions, the largest 
amplitude was observed for the slow condition, intermediate amplitude for the med 
condition, and the smallest amplitude for the fast condition.  Not only did this pattern 
emerge for both compatible and incompatible trials, the threshold values were 
comparable across compatibility conditions.  One possible alternative explanation for the 
lowering of LRP threshold with SAT, as mentioned, is the introduction of guess trials.  
To deal with this, the slow half of each median split was compared across the 3 SAT and 
2 compatibility conditions with the assumption that when a guess occurs, it will be faster 
than non-guess responses (Ollman, 1966; see also Gratton et al., 1988).  The overall 





 As discussed in the introduction, these observations constitute an important step 
in linking psychophysiology with behavior, as well as establishing that sequential-
sampling models are biologically plausible (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Bogacz, 2007; Lo & 
Wang, 2006).  To reiterate, neural correlates have been found for drift rate (e.g., Roitman 
& Shadlen, 2002) and for prior probability (e.g., Basso & Wurtz, 1997, 1998; Dorris & 
Munoz, 1998), but until now, not for criterion placement and the role it plays in behavior.  
As predicted, responses were produced when the LRP reached a criterion voltage.  
Whether a response was made in error or not was determined by the valence of the LRP, 
but not the threshold (i.e., it was equivalent for correct and error trials).  The deadline 
manipulation, known to affect subjects criterion placement, did in fact decrease criterion 
voltage needed to produce a response.  This is in complete agreement with the 
computational models described earlier. 
 Third, the data call into question a strict version of the constant criterion 
hypothesis (Gratton et al., 1988; see also Mordkoff & Grosjean, 2001).  Recall that these 
researchers have shown that the amplitude of the LRP at response onset is unrelated to 
response latency, indicative of a constant threshold.  It is interesting to note that data 
supporting the constant criterion hypothesis come from experiments where RT was not 
specifically controlled.  To the contrary, subjects in these tasks likely used a “be fast/be 
accurate” criterion setting, usually producing intermediate RTs and off-ceiling accuracy 
rates.  Compare this situation to the slow condition presented here.  It is possible that 
behavior in this block of trials is roughly comparable to “be fast/be accurate” instructions.  
Like such previous research, the present data also showed a constant criterion for the first 
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and second halves of a median split, but only for the slow condition.  In contrast, R-LRP 
amplitude tended to be smaller for the fast half of trials in the med and fast conditions.  
One explanation for this, touched upon earlier, is the “micro-SAT”.  According to some 
(e.g., Osman et al., 2000; Rinkenauer et al., 2004), response criteria are not fixed in a 
strong sense; rather, they have an average value.  On trials where the criterion happens to 
be a bit lower than average, faster responses result.  Conversely, when the criterion 
happens to be above average, slower trials result.  While this would explain the grand 
averages presented in Figures 19 and 20, it does not explain why the effect is 
idiosyncratic, appearing in some subjects/conditions, reversing in others.  One 
contributing factor could be the reduction in the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) incurred 
when performing a median split.  Because the critical data concern only correct trials, it 
was generally the case that the slow condition provided many more observations than the 
med condition, and certainly more than the fast condition.  Thus, the SNR tends to 
decrease with SAT condition.  This is not problematic for the grand average waveforms, 
given that LRPs are known to be stable at about 60 trials/hand, and most conditions 
approached if not exceeded this number.  In computing the median split, however, it was 
often the case that the number of contributing observations was as low as 25.  The fact 
that the first half was smaller than the second half sometimes, but not always, could be 
due to this noise, although this is highly speculative. 
 Another important outcome of this experiment concerns electrophysiological 
activity on trials where the deadline was missed.  Under the present model, a response is 
produced when the LRP reaches a criterion voltage.  Thus, it must be true that missed 
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deadlines, when they occur, are marked by an LRP that reaches this criterion voltage at a 
later time than made deadline trials.  Though it is not surprising that missed deadline R-
LRPs are later than made deadlines (they occur later by definition), it is important to note 
that the criterion voltage is the same for both.  Comparable data is evident in other work.  
Shin, Fabiani, & Gratton (2004) observed subthreshold LRP activity even on trials where 
a response was not produced.  This suggests that responses will only occur when critical 
threshold is reached.  In other work, Hanes and Schall (1996) recorded FEF neurons 
during a stop-signal task.  They estimated response threshold during no-signal trials (in 
which subjects simply make an eye movement toward a target).  Then, they examined 
neural activity to stop-signal trials.  They found that neural activity during successfully 
inhibited trials did not reach this critical threshold, while unsuccessfully inhibited trials 
did cross this threshold.  This is interesting in light of the S-LRP data presented in Figure 
28.  These waveforms suggest that missed deadline trials are marked by an initial 
lateralization towards the incorrect response.  The time required for subsequent recovery 
from this produces a delay in reaching criterion threshold. 
Baseline Versus Criterion 
 The LATER model, and other sequential sampling models, posit that SAT 
settings either lengthen or shorten the distance that an information function must travel 
before reaching threshold; hence the variability in RT and accuracy rate.  It is interesting 
to note that, at least in the LATER model, these data are equally well accommodated by a 
model in which the baseline shifts.  In other words, the LATER model cares only about 
the distance from baseline to threshold.  Whether the effect of SAT is to reduce threshold 
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or increase baseline is not separable (it is, however, separable in more sophisticated 
models).   
 At least one study has made the argument that the effect of SAT is to change 
baseline, not threshold.  Although this is contrary to many current and past models, it 
cannot be discounted as a viable alternative.  Van Veen (2006) measured neural activity 
using fMRI while subjects performed a modified Simon task (Simon, 1969).  Subjects 
were told that upon onset of a red square, they should press a key with their left hand; 
upon onset of a green square, they were to push a button with their right hand.  Critically, 
these squares could appear in two locations: either to the left or to the right of center.  
The typical Simon effect is exhibited by a slowing of responses to “respond left” when 
presented on the right, and to “response right” stimuli, when presented on the left, than 
when the response mapping and screen locations coincide.  Subjects performed this task 
under two levels of speed stress (be fast vs. be accurate), cued prior to each trial (i.e., 
trials were not blocked according to SAT condition).  Van Veen found areas of premotor 
cortex (PMC), supplementary motor area (SMA), and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) that 
were more active in the high speed stress condition.  He argued, based on this that 
subjects attempt to reduce the “distance” between baseline and threshold by modifying 
the former rather than the latter.  There are a number of reasons to question Van Veen’s 
conclusion.  First, due to its poor temporal resolution, fMRI can not be used to measure 
neural activity at the precise moment a response is produced; if SAT instructions did 
interact with criterion, it could not be observed.  Second, it is possible that in response to 
speed instructions, subjects prime both hands.  This could lead to greater neural 
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activation as evidenced by fMRI; however, the present model (and others) argues that it 
is the difference in activity that constitutes criterion.  Thus, priming both response 
channels should not matter (i.e., one channel would still have to beat out the other 
channel by a criterion amount).  Still, this is not incompatible with so-called race models, 
which posit two independent counters racing towards independent criteria.  In this case, 
priming both response channels would have a facilitating effect.  Further work will be 
required to assess the viability of a changing baseline model. 
 One potential alternative explanation to Experiment 1 concerns the confounding 
of block order with practice.  It is not altogether clear what effect practice has on the 
LRP, and particularly, the amplitude of the LRP at response onset.  Though some 
researchers claim that the amplitude of the LRP is resistant to practice effects even after 
significant practice (Gratton, personal communication, 6 February, 2007), this claim has 
not been put to systematic test.  The potential problem this raises for the current work is 
straightforward.  Recall that the order of presentation was, for all subjects, slow, med, 
then fast.  Hence, if practice serves to reduce the peak amplitude of the LRP, then the 
pattern observed in Experiment 1 could be artifactual.  As well, it is possible that some 
other aspect of block order led to the observations detailed above.  Perhaps subjects exert 
less effort, pay less attention, or even give up later in the task.  Each of these could lead 
to a decrease in R-LRP amplitude.  To deal with these possibilities, Experiment 2 
presented the blocks in reverse order (i.e., fast, med, then slow).  Also, to reduce potential 
practice effects, Experiment 2 employed the same subjects from Experiment 1, who at 
this point had 3 hours of training on this task.  Additionally, subjects were provided with 
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3 practice blocks at each level of speed stress prior to beginning the experiment proper.   
If the results of Experiment 1 were due solely to block order, then Experiment 2 
should exhibit a reversal in the R-LRP orderings.  In other words, the largest to smallest 
amplitude should be, respectively, fast, med, slow.  Alternatively, if the results of 
Experiment 1 were solely a practice effect, then one would expect to see no difference in 
R-LRP amplitude at response onset across the 3 SAT conditions.  To put it simply, they 
will all rise to the same point.   
The basis for this confound in Experiment 1 was the possibility that following a 
fast set, subjects would be less able to revert to a slower SAT setting.  If this occurs in 
Experiment 2, it will be readily observable in the behavioral data: all RTs and accuracy 







 The 6 individuals who participated in Experiment 1 returned.  As before, they 
were paid $10/hour in a single 3-hour session.  The latency between sessions was 
variable, but less than 4 weeks for all subjects. 
Flanker Task 
 The task was identical to that used in Experiment 1 with the following exceptions.  
First, the order of blocks was reversed.  Subjects began with the fast block, then 
performed the med and slow blocks.  Prior to beginning the experiment, subjects also 
completed 3 practice blocks: one at each deadline.  Each practice block consisted of 40 
trials, half of which were compatible and half of which were incompatible. 
Electrophysiological Recording 
 All instruments and recording parameters were identical to Experiment 1. 
Results 
Behavioral Data 
Data were first structured to support a time-course analysis.  10 Vincentized ntile 
bins were created on each subjects’ RTs separately for compatible and incompatible 
trials.  The analyses to be reported below were run in the context of a 2 (compatibility: 
compatible vs. incompatible) x 3 (SAT: fast, medium, slow) x 10 (RT bin) repeated-
measures ANOVA.  Huynh-Feldt corrections were employed for violations of sphericity. 
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The speed-accuracy tradeoff was again apparent in the behavioral data (i.e., RT 
and accuracy rate) as reflected in Table 4.  Subject-level data are presented in Tables A3 
and A4.  For RT, there was a main effect of SAT condition, F(2,10) = 61.36, p < .001, 
Table 4. 
Mean RT (ms) and Accuracy Rate by Compatibility and SAT 
Condition  Slow Med Fast 
RT 427 381 329 Compatible 
ACC .96 .89 .77 
RT 461 400 336 Incompatible 
ACC .86 .66 .54 
 
partial η2 = .93, and a main effect of compatibility (i.e., the “flanker” effect), F(1,10) = 
68.91, p < .001, partial η2 = .93.  Repeated contrasts revealed that the fast condition was 
significantly faster than the med condition, F(1,5) = 44.43, p < .01, partial η2 = .90, and 
the med condition was significantly faster than the slow condition, F(1,5) = 35.98, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .88.  As Table 4 suggests, the “flanker” effect tended to diminish as 
speed stress increased.  This is supported by a compatibility x SAT interaction, F(2,10) = 
4.81, p < .05, partial η2 = .49. 
 Because each subject in Experiment 2 was the same as that for Experiment 1, an 
additional within-subjects factor of “session” was included in a 2 (session) x 2 
(compatibility) x 3 (SAT) x 10 (latency bin) ANOVA.  There was no main effect of 
session, but there did emerge a significant session x compatibility x bin interaction, 
F(9,45) = 5.47, p < .05, partial η2 = .52.  RTs for incompatible trials tended to be lower in 
the second session, but only at later latency bins.  Stated differently, the flanker effect in 
RT was decreased in session 2 when considering only slower, overall, responses. 
 Similar patterns were evident for accuracy rate.  A main effect of SAT condition 
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indicated poorer performance as speed stress increased, F(2,10) = 26.34, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .84.  The flanker effect, reflected by higher accuracy rate to compatible than 
incompatible trials, was supported by a main effect of compatibility, F(1,10) = 20.42, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .80.  As shown in Table 4, the decrease in accuracy rate was stronger for 
incompatible trials than compatible trials.  Accordingly, the strength of the flanker effect 
increased with speed stress, as indicated by a compatibility x SAT interaction, F(2,10) = 
5.00, p < .05, partial η2 = .50.  Note that the flanker effect results are in opposite for RT 
and accuracy rate: with increasing speed stress, the flanker effect diminished for RT and 
increased for accuracy rate. 
 As with RT, session was added as an additional within-subjects factor.  This 
analysis revealed that the flanker effect on accuracy rate was somewhat lower in session 
2, again only considering slower overall responses.  This was supported by a session x 
compatibility x bin interaction, F(9,45) = 2.37, p < .05, partial η2 = .32. 
Latency Distributions 
Figures 29 and 30 present latency distributions for compatible and incompatible 
trials, respectively, as a function of SAT condition.  Observations < 150 ms were 
discarded from analyses as anticipations.  Doing so eliminated less than .002% of the 
data.  The upper panels depict correct trial latencies, the bottom panels error latencies.  
As well, Table 5 presents the proportion of missed deadlines for each compatibility and 










% Missed Deadlines and Median RT (ms) for Made and Missed Trials: Experiment 2 
Condition Slow (dead = 550) Med (dead = 450) Fast (dead = 375) 
3.6% 11.2% 19.7% Compatible 418 586 368 475 314 404 
8.3% 19.7% 25.5% Incompatible 450 586 381 482 313 409 
 
Conditional Accuracy Functions 
CAFs for Experiment 2 are depicted in Figures 31 and 32.  These CAFs indicate 
that the SAT manipulation did alter subjects’ response criteria: accuracy rates are 
dependent on SAT condition, even when holding RT constant.  Because the latency bin 
means were not statistically equivalent between the SAT conditions, ANOVA is again 
inappropriate.  To verify that the CAFs vary by SAT condition, the Friedman 
nonparametric test was used as a surrogate for a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA.  
For compatible trials, the first test considered slow bin 7, med bin 9, and fast bin 10 
(latencies between 440 and 442 ms).  This test was significant, χ2 (2) = 10.00, p < .01.  A 
second test considered RTs between 374-388 ms (slow bin 2, med bin 6, and fast bin 9).  
This test, too, was significant χ2 (2) = 7.64, p < .05.  Similar tests were run on the 
incompatible CAFs.  The first test on incompatible trials considered slow bin 6, med bin 
9, and fast bin 10, while a second test considered slow bin 2, med bin 5, and fast bin 9.  
The first test was significant, χ2 (2) = 6.87, p < .05, but the second was not, χ2 (2) = 3.00, 
ns.  In comparing Figure 32 with Figure 12, it appears that the med and fast conditions 
are somewhat more similar in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, particularly
 
 
Figure 29.  Latency distributions for compatible trials.  Upper panel: correct trial latencies.  Lower panel: incorrect trial 
latencies.















Compatible Fast: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines












Compatible Med: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines












Compatible Slow: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines
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Incompatible Fast: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines
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Incompatible Slow: Incorrect Made & Missed Deadlines
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Figure 31.  Upper panel: Compatible CAFs for Experiment 2.  Horizontal bars depict + 1 
s.e.m for RT; vertical bars depict the same for accuracy rate.  Lower panel: observed RTs 
by ntile bin.  Vertical bars represent + 1 s.e.m.



















































































































Figure 32.  Upper panel: Incompatible CAFs for Experiment 2.  Horizontal bars depict + 
1 s.e.m for RT; vertical bars depict the same for accuracy rate.  Lower panel: observed 










moved in the sam
LATER Mo
atible trials, is the “dip” below chance performance.  Despite the fact that mean 
accuracy was below .50 for the first bin in the med and fast conditions, this could not be 
d statistically.   
To summarize thus far, mean comparisons and time-course analyses confirmed 
that subjects’ response criteria were changing due to the deadline manipulation.  It must 
wever, that accuracy rates for the incompatible med and fast conditions were 
ilar in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 at early time points.  We can 
conclude that subjects did not get “stuck” in a fast set, as mean RT and accuracy rates 
e direction as in Experiment 1.  
del 
Behavioral data for correct trials were fit to the LATER sequential sampling 
model using SPIC software (Carpenter, 2007).  Figures 33 and 34 present these fits.  
Tested specifically was a “swivel” versus a “shift” model using a log likelihood ratio test.  
Recall that in the LATER model, manipulations that affect criterion will lead to a 
“swiveling” of lines about a common intercept when plotted on reciprobit.  At the same 
nipulations that affect drift rate lead to a horizontal shifting of lines.  The log 
likelihood ratio test favored a “swivel” model for both compatible, LLR = 15131, p < .01 
patible trials, LLR = 12703, p < .01.  Subject level tests are provided in Figure 




As a whole the behavioral data are consistent with a shifting criterion due to the 
model was favored for Subject 2 in the compatible condition. 
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enforced response deadlines.  First, mean RT and accuracy rate decreased as speed-st
increased.  Second, CAFs showed that accuracy rates were dependent on SAT condition
holding RT constant.  Finally, fits to the LATER sequential-sampling model were 
consistent with a shifting
ress 
, 
 criterion between conditions.  We can thus be confident that the 
ly 
a 
forms depicted below include only 
unless otherwise noted.  LRPs were computed so that correct activation 
deadline manipulation had the expected behavioral effects. 
Electrophysiological Data 
 LRPs were derived in the same manner as in Experiment 1.  Again, certain 
conditions did not yield enough observations to support stable LRPs.  These main
concerned incorrect compatible trials and compatible trials with missed deadlines.  Dat
for these conditions will not be reported.  All wave
made deadlines, 




Figure 33.  Reciprobit plot for compatible trials.  The swiveling of the lines about a 
common intercept is consistent with a change in criterion/threshold. 
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Figure 34.  Reciprobit plot for incompatible trials.  The swiveling of the lines about a 
common intercept is consistent with a change in criterion/threshold. 
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EMG Onset Detection  
 EMG was detected as in Experiment 1.  For each subject and each hand, a 
criterion voltage was established that reliably differentiated muscle potentials from 
background noise.  On average, EMG medians were 76.0 ms faster than RTs.  Table 6 
presents EMG and RT medians as a function of SAT condition and compatibility (for 
correct trials on which the deadline was met). 
 
Table 6. 
Median EMG versus RT  and (standard deviation): Correct and Deadline Met 
 Slow (dead = 550) Med (dead = 450) Fast (dead = 375) 
 EMG RT EMG RT EMG RT 
Compatible 337 (91) 418 (47) 292 (69) 370 (42) 250 (58) 321 (42) 







































Figure 36 Grand-avera Ps fo rrect, atible trials. 
 
Compatible and Incompatible Correct R-LRPs
.  ge R-LR r co incomp
 
 Figures 35 and 36 present grand average R-LRP waveforms for compatible and 
incompatible trials, respectively.  The difference between Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2 is readily apparent.  Whereas Experiment 1 showed R-LRP threshold to be a decreasing 
function of SAT, Experiment 2 suggests that there may be no relationship.  Figure 35, for 
compatible trials, clearly shows that the R-LRP voltage at EMG onset is nearly identical 
for the slow, med, and fast conditions.  For incompatible trials, although the slow 
condition has a somewhat larger amplitude, the med and fast conditions are identical at 
response onset (time 0).  A 2 (compatibility) x 3 (SAT) repeated-measures ANOVA 
gh there was a main 
effect of compatibility, F(1,5) = 7.03, p < .05, partial η2 = .58 and an SAT x compatibility 
interaction, F(2,10) = 3.61, p = .066, partial η2 = .42.  Simple effects analysis revealed 
confirmed that there was no main effect of SAT condition, althou
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that this interaction was due to increased incompatible R-LRP amplitudes (as compared 
to compatible R-LRP amplitudes) in the slow condition, t(5) = -4.99, p < .01. 
Compatible and Incompatible Median Splits 
 As in Experiment 1, a median split was performed on each subjects’ RTs for each 
compatibility and SAT condition.  The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the extent to 
which criterion remains constant within a given deadline block.  Prior research has shown 
that the amplitude of the LRP at response does not vary with a trial’s latency within a 
condition, giving rise to the so-called “constant criterion” hypothesis (Gratton et al., 
1988).  Recall that data presented in Experiment 1 was not altogether consistent with this
hypothesis.  Namely, a constant criterion was observed for the slow condition, but the fast 
aller for the med and fast conditions.  Experiment 2 plots are 
presented in Figure 37 and 38.  It is clear that there is no consistent relationship between 
R-LRP amplitude and latency.  For instance, the first half actually has higher amplitude 
A 2 (compatibility) x 2 (median: fast vs. slow) x 3 (SAT) repeated-measures ANOVA 
of median did obtain, F(1,5) = 6.73, p < .05, partial η  = .57.  Collapsing across 
  
 
half tended to be sm
in the incompatible med condition, while it is smaller in the incompatible fast condition.  
yielded no significant interactions regarding compatibility or SAT, although a main effect 
2
compatibility and SAT condition, the mean amplitude for the fast half was M = 3.82 µV 
and M = 3.77 µV for the slow half.  This is opposite to that observed in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 37.  Grand average R-LRP waveforms after median split for compatible trials. 
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Figure 38.  Grand average R-LRP waveforms after median split for incompatible trials. 
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Incorrect Responses 
 In Experiment 1, the argument was made that subjects commit an error when the 
information function reaches the wrong boundary, although the criterion placement is 
roughly the same.  Stated differently, errors should be marked by an R-LRP that looks 
just like a correct trial, but flipped in sign.  Plots for compatible (fast) and incompatible 
(med and fast) are presented in Figures 39 and 40 (there were not enough observations to 
derive any other conditions).  The mean amplitude at response were as follows
compatible fast (correct: 3.29 µV; incorrect: -3.32 µV), incompatible med (correct: 3.69 
µV; incorrect: -2.64 µV), incompatible fast (correct: 3.81 µV; incorrect: -3.60).  Although 
the mean amplitude between correct and incorrect trials was quite similar for compatible 
fast and incompatible fast, there was a marked departure for the incompatible med 















Figure 39.  Grand-average R-LRP for correct and incorrect compatible fast trials.   
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trials.   
 
 In Experiment 1, the argument was made that the reason subjects miss a dead
is because th























ey did not reach criterion voltage before the response deadline was enforced.  
his es was 
e same for each SAT condition.   Also, S-LRPs showed a pattern whereby missed 
eadlines began to rise later and were encumbered by activity that appeared to go in the 
correct direction (i.e., subjects began to prepare the incorrect response).  These patterns 
re evident in Experiment 2 as well.  Figure 41, 42 and 43 below depict grand-average R-
RP waveforms for incompatible correct made and missed deadlines.  It is clear that the 
mplitude of these waveforms at response onset is quite similar, with the exception of the 
fast condition, where made deadlines elicit a somewhat larger peak.  A 2 (compatibility) 
x 2 (deadline: made vs. missed) x 3 (SAT) repeated-measures ANOVA, however, did not  


























Figure 41.  Grand-average R-LRPs for made and missed deadlines: slow condition. 




















Figure 42.  Grand-average R-LRPs for made and missed deadlines: med condition. 


















Figure 43.  Grand-average R-LRPs for made and missed deadlines: fast condition 
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Figure 44.  Grand-average S-LRPs for made and missed deadlines in the incompatible 
condition (correct trials only). 
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indicate any main effects or interactions.  Looking next at S-LRPs for the same 
conditions, it is not difficult to see why subjects’ responses would have been delayed.  
Clearly, the lateralization of the LRP indicates priming of the incorrect hand (downward 
deflections) early in the trial, followed later by a recovery (see Figure 44).  It is likely that 
this is the basis for delayed responses. 
Discussion 
 Unlike Experiment 1, amplitude of the R-LRP at response onset was unrelated to 
SAT condition.  Rather than declining with speed stress, all waveforms tended to reach 
the same amplitude at response.  Also unlike Experiment 1, median splits revealed that 
amplitude of the LRP is unrelated to response latency, being equivalent for fast trials and 
slow trials. 
 There were, however, notable similarities between Experiments 1 and 2.  
Behaviorally, there was very little difference between the two datasets.  Mean RT and 
accuracy rates were remarkably similar, and time-course decomposition (CAF functions) 
indicated the same.  As well, LATER model fits indicated that a change in response 
criteria was occurring in roughly the same manner as in Experiment 1.  
Electrophysiologically, incorrect and correct trials tended to have the same threshold for 
response, but opposite in sign.  Likewise, made and missed deadline trials had the same 
criterion, although S-LRPs showed that missed deadlines were much delayed.  It was 
speculated that one reason for this delay is the priming of the incorrect response; the fact 
that recovery must occur before the waveform rises towards the correct boundary may be 




 The results of Experiments 1 and 2 paint an interesting, if not altogether 
consistent, picture of human decision making.  The central thesis, that the amplitude of 
the LRP is related to response criteria as predicted by sequential-sampling models and 
single-unit recordings, was strongly supported in Experiment 1.  Experiment 2 data pose 
 
 1 and 2. 
problems for this conclusion, as no relationship between R-LRP amplitude and SAT 
condition was observed.  It is likely that further work will be required to fully understand
the nature of the relationship, though some speculation is warranted.  In the following 
sections, each piece of the theory will be detailed along with the conclusions from 
Experiments
Main Thesis 
 Two alternative explanations were initially examined to account for the predicte
pattern of decreasing R-LRP amplitude with increasing speed stress.  First was the 
possibility that an increasing proportion of “guess” trials contaminated the data.  As 
mentioned, it is unclear what effect random guesses would have on the L
response is still produced.  It is entirely possible that such trials would elicit the same 
LRP, but earlier in time.  Also, there is a large difference between a “true guess” (i.e., the
response is predetermined before the stimulus onset) and responses that merely feel lik
guesses due to low criterion placement.  Subjects were instructed to never randomly 
guess – all trials were to be responded to meaningfully, even if those responses resulted 
in a high proportion of e
d 
RP, given that a 
 
e 
rrors.  During debriefing, subjects were probed as to the 
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likelihood that some of their response ndom guesses.  All indicated that 
random guesses played no role , and requires systematic 
 and 
 
rials were not a confounding factor. 




s consisted of ra
.  Of course this is speculative
test.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine which trials are truly “guesses”
which are simply inaccurate.  However, it may be possible to attenuate their influence, 
and this is the approach taken in Experiment 1.  Research suggests that guess trials, if 
they occur, generally occur at very fast latencies.  For instance, CAFs presented here and 
elsewhere (Gratton et al., 1988; Heitz & Engle, in press) show that true chance 
performance occurs at the fastest overall latencies.  Hence, if one simply considers the 
slow half of a median split, the influence of such guesses should be much attenuated, if
not eliminated altogether.  Doing so led to the same overall pattern of R-LRPs, 
suggesting that guess t
 Secon
lateralizing in preparation of a response.  When this occurs, the computation of an R-LRP 
uses a baseline correction that is artificially high.  By subtracting out an average act
that is too high, these LRPs would become too small.  The pattern observed in 
Experiment 1 could thus be due to changing proportions of “pre-lateralization” trials.  To 
deal with this,  R-LRPs for the fast condition were re-computed using a baseline period
centered on the warning tone, eliminating the problem described above.  This, too, left 
the pattern unchanged.  Why, then, did subjects in Experiment 2 show equivalent R-RLP
thresholds at each SAT condition?   
 On the one hand, behavioral data suggest that subjects performed the task quite 
similarly across Experiments 1 and 2.  Not only were mean RT and accuracy rate 
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remarkably similar, but CAF functions exhibited little change.  Notable also is the fact 
that these data (including LATER model fits) indicate that subjects were, in fact, alteri
response criterioa in roughly the same manner across Experiments 1 and 2.  Also, it is 
clear that subjects did not get “stuck” in a fast cognitive set, ruling out the possibility th
all conditions were functionally fast.  On the other hand, electrophysiological data are 
discrepant across the two studies.  In other words, Experiment 2 dissociated behavior 
from electrophysiology. 
 The basis for Experiment 2 concerned the confounding of SAT condition order 
with practice.  For that reason, the same subjects were brought back for Experiment 2.  
The prediction was made that if Experiment 1 was due to a practice effect, then 
Experiment 2 should yield identical R-LRPs in each SAT c
ng 
at 
ondition – exactly what was 
nt 2, who 
 
hey did in the fast block, but withheld their response 
 rate, 
found.  Yet, if a practice effect is indeed to blame, it apparently only affects 
electrophysiological responses, as behavioral data showed little to no effect of session 
(i.e., non-practiced vs. practiced).  Perhaps it is the case that subjects respond in a 
qualitatively different way in Experiment 2.  Suppose that subjects in Experime
received fast, med, then slow, actually do get “stuck” in a fast cognitive set.  Or, to use 
less loaded terminology, perhaps subjects became accustomed to the timing of the fast 
condition.  At the same time, subjects knew that they were supposed to show increasing
RTs with decreasing speed stress.  It is possible that subjects determined their response in 
the slow block in the same way that t
so as to produce a longer RT.  This could lead to identical electrophysiological data while 
leaving RTs unaffected.  Unfortunately, this does not explain the SAT in accuracy
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which should be absent had subjects selected their response early. 
 Another possibility concerns the median split data across the two experiments.  In 
Experiment 1, the fast half of each split yielded a lower R-LRP amplitude than the slow
half, at least for the med and fast conditions.  This pattern was not evident in Experiment 
2.  If Experiment 1 med and fast conditions contained some trials with overall lower R-
LRP amplitudes, then averaging across these would serve to lower R-LRP amplitude. 
This would not have been
 
 





unrelated to median split.  This concern is somewhat alleviated by the observation that 
the same pattern emerged in Experiment 1 when considering only the slow halves of eac
SAT condition.  For this to be viable, however, one must make the assumption th
slow halves were not contaminated by whatever it was that caused the fast halves to elicit 
smaller R-LRPs.  Whether or not this assumption is tenable cannot be determ
 While the data thus far are consistent with a practice effect explanation, this 
author is reluctant to concede this without further test.  For instance, a simple pract
effect would predict declining R-LRP amplitude if subjects performed slow-slow-slow or 
med-med-med.  As well, a direct replication of Experiment 1 with a new set of subjects 
would be desirable to establish that the effect is real. 
Errors and Missed Deadlines 
 One interesting pattern emerging from both Experiments 1 and 2 concern the 
ability of the R-LRP to predict errors and missed deadlines.  It is quite astonishing how 
similar the waveforms are for correct and error trials, particularly the consistency of the 
threshold value between the two.  That the threshold remained constant reinforces the 
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reiterate, all responses are produced when brain asymmetry reaches a threshold value.  
For a right hand response to occur, the left hemisphere must “beat out” the right 
hemisphere by a set amount.  This set amount is unchanged even when an error is to be 
produced.   
 Similar observations are made regarding made and missed deadline trials.  Like 
correct and error responses, made and missed deadline responses are produced at a
LRP threshold.  Missed deadlines, when they occur, simply rise to that threshold value 
later in time.  Unfortunately for the subject, this time point was after the enforced 
response deadline.  This is not altogether surprising in and of itself (missed deadlines by
definition must occur later than made trials), though the accompanying S-LRP data is 
somewhat revealing.  Not only are missed deadline trials delayed, but the LRP tend
drift towards the incorrect boundary.  This provides additional evidence supporting t
efficacy of R-LRP amplitude in predicting response onset.  It is worthy of note that 
identical patterns were observed in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Conclusion 
 The data presented in this work speak to the use of the LRP in examining the link 
gy.  The amplitude of the LRP is unquestionably related to 
me a  
  
.   
between behavior and physiolo
so spect of response production, and in particular, there is good evidence that it is
represents a threshold.  Whether or not this threshold is equivalent to the idea of 
“criterion” emerging from computational models remains to be conclusively determined.
Determining the reliability of data presented in Experiment 1 will be key in this regard
 95
APPENDIX A 
INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT DATA 
Experiment 1 
Table A1. 
E1: COMPATIBLE TRIALS 
Subject  Slow Med Fast 
RT 425 368 285 1 
ACC .96 .83 .65 
RT 440 389 348 2 
ACC .97 .96 .90 
RT 463 399 336 3 
ACC .95 .95 .83 
RT 425 381 330 4 
ACC .97 .93 .73 
RT 453 365 325 5 
ACC .91 .68 .56 
RT 403 372 332 6 
ACC .99 .99 .84 
 
Table A2. 
E1: INCOMPATIBLE TRIALS 
Subject  Slow Med Fast 
RT 471 379 287 1 
ACC .85 .60 .48 
RT 480 420 367 2 
ACC .92 .77 .62 
RT 512 422 348 3 
ACC .88 .74 .46 
RT 481 411 331 4 
ACC .75 .53 .46 
RT 470 376 314 5 
ACC .63 .56 .46 
RT 455 412 343 6 







Figure A1.  Subject-level likelihood ratio tests for a “swivel”
ent 1. 
 versus a “shift” LATER 












Figure A2.  Subject-level likelihood ratio tests for a “swivel” versus a “shift” LATER 


















































































































































































































































E2: COMPATIBLE TRIALS 
Subject  Slow Med Fast 
RT 433 390 311 1 
ACC .97 .90 .68 
RT 430 389 355 2 
ACC .98 .95 .95 
RT 429 384 335 3 
ACC .97 .94 .86 
RT 424 381 329 4 
ACC .99 .94 .80 
RT 455 375 319 5 
ACC .87 .65 .55 
RT 392 368 321 6 
ACC .99 .96 .78 
 
Table A4. 
E2: INCOMPATIBLE TRIALS 
Subject  Slow Med Fast 
RT 464 417 308 1 
ACC .84 .63 .53 
RT 450 407 381 2 
ACC .94 .82 .77 
RT 454 399 358 3 
ACC .85 .84 .61 
RT 492 400 331 4 
ACC .85 .45 .34 
RT 481 382 323 5 
ACC .80 .51 .52 
RT 424 395 312 6 






Figure A5.  Subject-level likelihood ratio tests for a “swivel” versus a “shift” LATER 










Figure A6.  Subject-level likelihood ratio tests for a “swivel” versus a “shift” LATER 




























































































































































































































































1There are important differences between signal detection theory (SDT) and sequential-
sampling models, sometimes known as “dynamic signal detection theory” (DST; 
Balakrishnan, Busemeyer, MacDonald, & Lin, 2006; see also Smith & Ratcliff, 2004).  
Essentially, SDT assumes that decisions are based on a single sample of information, 
while sequential-sampling models allow a decision process to evolve, over time.  While 
some attempts have been made to extend SDT in this regard (see Wickens, 2002), it still 
fails as a complete model of decision making, as it makes only accuracy-rate predictions.  
Other models, such as stage theory (e.g., Sternberg, 1969) similarly only make RT 
predictions.  Some sequential-sampling models have a considerable advantage over both
as they simultaneously account for both accuracy rate and RT without over-
parameterization. 
2The author will occasionally use the term “accumulator models” synonymously with 
“sequential-sampling” models.  The latter term is used to emphasize the accumulating 
nature of the process, not to endorse any particular model, as “accumulator models” 
, 
proper, which consist of a race between two independent processes. 
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